KENYA NEWS NETWORK: य्क९२ FACTOR

य्क९२ FACTOR

WILLIAM S RUTO

We really are doomed; every manoeuvre being taken by our politicians is for selfish reasons’ many of these leaders have never stopped for a moment to think about us Kenyans. Now Ruto is going to use the Riftvalley voting block to bargain with ODMers for the presidency, he of YK92 anarchy and his fellow KANU frontmen have a mucky background and caused Kenya’s so much pain, if they were in the USA they would be sitting on death row awaiting the electric execution.Nicolas Biwott has called for a KANU unity both old and new. A while a go, I wrote that old KANU would form the next government through the back door and some one said my head needed checking. The KANU gameplan is beginning to unfold. Watch this space!Kenyans we need a clean start, a new breed of politicians perhaps we need to purge out all these manic power hungry people. We could set an emergency one off age limit for those vying for parliamentary seats to something like 50 years so that other new leaders can emerge, we just can’t keep on recycling the same old lot they are up to no good.

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THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER IS....................

By Patrick Mathangani Former MPs have been told to stop grumbling since they are responsible for the poverty afflicting Kenyans today. On Friday, Mr Gacuuru Karenge, himself a former MP for Kandara, said they failed to make policies that could reduce poverty. "We who sit here are basically responsible for the problems in this country," Karenge told the more than 100 former legislators attending a meeting in Nairobi. "We sit here saying that we should remain waheshimiwa while the majority of Kenyans are languishing in poverty," he said. The two-day meeting has had former MPs complaining how they now lead miserable lives. They have also called for a law to be passed to give them a fat pension. But Karenge, who gave a paper highlighting poverty levels in the country, told the former MPs not to burden Kenya with demands for money. "We were very powerful. Some of us were very near State House. We were in a position to make good policies but we did not," he said amid protests from his colleagues. He said: "We should not be lamenting. We should be sorry that we made others suffer." Politicians have failed Kenyans, he said, and advised that ODM-Kenya and Narc-Kenya would not help the situation. Said he: "How do I move around with a Sh44 million limousine when I am MP for the biggest slum?" At that point, the former MPs shot up in protest, saying it was wrong to blame them for Kenya’s woes. The Hummer debate also took centre-stage, with Mr Martin Shikuku saying remarks the vehicle cost Sh44 million were lies. He said he General Motors told him the most expensive one could not exceed Sh28 million. "God hates lies. Lies belong to Satan," he said. However, a former minister in President Jomo Kenyatta’s government, Mr Nathan Munoko, said leaders had caused divisions in the country. "As leaders, we have refused to grow up. Leaders keep telling lies," he said. Dr Moses Misoi, former MP for Eldoret South, said most MPs had not performed. "Even when we were in Parliament, how much did we do in villages to mobilise Kenyans to develop themselves?" he posed. He said it was wrong for MPs to take charge of the CDF kitty since they would use it for campaigns. Justice and Constitutional Affairs minister, Ms Martha Karua, said everybody should accept blame for what has gone wrong and work towards improving the lives of Kenyans.

LETTER TO PRESIDENT MWAI KIBAKI

This is a letter of profound gratitude and appreciation to you and your Government following the inauguration of the Dedan Kimathi Memorial statue one month ago, on the aptly road named Kimathi street.The unveiling of the Dedan Kimathi Memorial statue clearly demonstrates the seriousness with which your Government holds the freedom struggle in this country, long consigned to the oblivion by our country. A lot of criticism has been levelled against you and your Government over the past one month, over what is perceived as the high cost and inadequacy of the Memorials. These are standpoints that cannot be accorded any measure of seriousness, because Kenyans as a whole have shown no regard and no respect for their heritage and the freedom struggle over the last fifty years. The Chief Executive Officer of the lead local mobile phone network provider Safaricom, has just announced that the Safaricom subscriber base is due to hit the six million mark at the end of March 2007. If the six million had donated only 10 Kenya shillings to a cause such as the establishment of Trust Fund dealing with all aspects related to the freedom struggle in Kenya, then an initial amount of 60 million Kenya shillings (approximately US $ 850,000), would have been immediately raised. It therefore makes no sense to raise hue and cry over the Memorial’s approximate stated cost of US $ 57,000.Of much greater importance though Sir, is the need to fast track and solidify a clearer and more accurate documentation of Kenyan history in general. We know and understand too little about ourselves and are doing even less towards remedying this serious anomaly. Your Government’s unveiling of the Dedan Kimathi Memorial statue has however encouraged me enough to write you this letter.Our sister West African Republic of Ghana, has just marked the Golden Jubilee of her independence. Prior to this, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), World Service, ran a most interesting series and analysis on Ghana’s fifty years of independence, featuring a wide cross section of individuals and views, and defined by Kwame Nkrumah’s remarks of 6th March 1957 that “Ghana, your beloved country, is free forever”.In quick succession, the BBC World Service will certainly carry numerous other similar features, as several other African countries approach the Golden Jubilees of their independence. At the rate at which socio-cultural deterioration continues to take place in this country, the Kenyan feature due for the year 2013, will clearly rank amongst the most colourless of all the African features, and we only have ourselves to blame for this.On 1st June 1963, the date we attained internal self governance in Kenya, founding President Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, stated that “This is the happiest day of my life”. Will the nation truly echo this on 1st June 2013, and who is to blame…….?Mau Mau, the movement that Dedan Kimathi led, is in itself little understood, despite it’s distinguished prominence in Kenya’s history. Very few people for instance, know of the tactics employed by Mau Mau in the freedom struggle, and even fewer have bothered with this aspect of our history, despite the fact that Mau Mau was the key reason that a State of Emergency was declared on 20th October 1952, and one of the key reasons that Britain became ever more keen on speeding up and granting political independence to it’s colonies in Africa. For instance, Great Britain initially intended to grant independence to Kenya in 1973.Why do we now have a grand statue of a great Kenyan on Nairobi’s Kimathi street, yet we have next to no understanding of who he was and what he stood for, and even less, of the movement he led……? Why are many Kenyans able to describe the effective “Cow Horn” military tactics employed by revered 19th century South African Zulu leader Shaka, yet we know nothing of the Mau Mau tactics that sent shock waves amongst the British, both here and abroad……? This is further complicated by the fact that several individuals belonging to Kimathi’s generation, have gone to their rest.Why were Kenyans so easily duped into believing that Kimathi’s rival for leadership in Mau Mau, Gen. Stanley Mathenge, was alive and well in neighbouring Ethiopia, only for the hoax to be played out in very shameful, humiliating and depressing circumstances in the year 2003? Do we really care for the truth? Do we really care for our heritage? Do we really care for posterity? Do we really care for anything?It is in this respect Sir, that I humbly suggest that your Government constitute a national committee on this country’s history, to address many of these serious flaws and misgivings in our country’s short history. I suggest that this be done by way of a legal notice in the Kenya Gazette. I further suggest that the said national committee on Kenya’s history be given a five year mandate and far reaching powers, to gather, collate and document any and all information related to this country’s past, in bid to define ourselves and our heritage better, and in a bid to build Kenya into a socio-cultural destination of choice, for both ourselves and the outside world. This should be a national undertaking aimed at addressing issues in and amongst all 42 communities in this country.Kenyans from all walks of life, of all ages and from all corners of this country, should be allowed to submit what can be regarded as “secrets” and/or “long withheld information” to this committee, “or forever hold our peace”. Time is running out, and we must work very hard to make up for large amounts of lost time and opportunities, and bequeath a tangible heritage to our descendants.This would be an expensive undertaking, whose members must be challenged with the added task of attracting partnerships, support, technical expertise and funding, in a joint venture to involve the Kenya Government, and outside partners, such as the BBC World Service. Depending on the dedication, discipline, commitment and how well the process is managed, the venture can partly culminate in the production of a full feature comprehensive documentary on Kenya’s freedom struggle in it’s entirety, similar to the award winning documentary on global warming, “An Inconvenient Truth”, which had the backing of no less than former US Vice President Al Gore, who describes himself as “I used to be the next president of the United States”, in the globally acclaimed award winning documentary. This would have an extremely favourable image on Kenya’s image both here and abroad.In this respect, I further humbly suggest that the proposed committee be chaired by Ramogi Achieng Oneko, the last remaining surviving member of the famous pre-independence sextet imprisoned by the Colonial Government at the infamous Kapenguria trial.Despite his advanced age, Ramogi Achieng Oneko continues to be active in public life, a profound statement of the goodwill he harbours for this country and it’s future. He stands out prominently on national days and was even present at the inauguration of Dedan Kimathi’s Memorial monument on 18th February 2007, where he delighted the gathering with events of yesteryear. He has a wealth of experience in a multiplicity of fields including diplomacy and administration, and his role in chairing such a high profile committee would accord it the desired credibility, desired goodwill, desired impetus and desired allure to outside partners and funding. I am certain that Ramogi Achieng Oneko would be more than willing to once again serve this country and it’s people, in such a distinguished and important role. I am able to write you this letter Sir for instance, because of the crucial role played by the likes of Ramogi Achieng Oneko in this country’s history.The committee must also be partly comprised of at least eight highly regarded national individuals, one each from Kenya’s eight provinces. It would be preferable if politicians were allowed no role at all in the proposed committee, Sir. In their place Sir, should be numerous local private sector companies/representatives, who continue to play a very useful high profile role in community affairs nationwide.Election year or no election year Sir, the truth of this country’s history must be told and documented in an accurate and comprehensive way, and should not be allowed continued existence in it’s current shallow, unhelpful and distasteful form. Kenya’s current state of socio-cultural affairs are a heinous shame, crime and disservice to itself, and humanity in general.Why should we take pride in quoting medieval history from other parts of the world, when we cannot sensibly reconstruct and document our history, for periods as recent as fifty years ago? Why should we take tremendous pride in quoting from the Holy Bible, and yet fail miserably in emulating those that made it possible for us to have the Holy Bible and it’s rich teachings in the first place?These are serious soul searching questions that we must ask ourselves Sir, as we chart out this country’s destiny and it’s future. When the BBC does the Golden Jubilee independence feature on Kenya in 2013, let it proudly stand out.Sir, I thank you once again for the important step that you and your Government have taken in re-defining our past and future. There is no future, if we do not recognise the past. Yours faithfully, James Willis Wang’ondu Nganga

KENYA SERVICE COMMISSION AT WORK

Vision and Mission Vision and Mission of Public Service Commission of Kenya VISION A partner in creating a non - partisan Public Service that offers quality service and holds the nation together for socio-economic growth MISSION To avail a steady supply of highly competent human resources for efficient and effective service delivery to the people of Kenya CORE VALUES -Meritocracy -Reliability -Team Spirit -Integrity - Confidentiality -Fairness <> [ Back ]

THE GENESIS OF THE CURRENT SOCIAL< POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC IN KENYA

KENYA - STATE OF CORRUPTION REPORT (ISSUE NO. 2) Centre for Law and Research International (CLARION) Published by Claripress Limited, Nairobi on behalf of Centre for Law and Research International (CLARION) (c) Copyright Centre for Law and Research International (CLARION) 2001 First Published 2001 ISBN 9966-915-36-2 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilised in any form or by any means electronic or mechanical including photocopy recording or by any information storage and retrireview system without permission in writing from the publisher except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical reviews and articles and for educational purposes. Typeset by: Hussein Khalid and Winnie Nyawira on behalf of Centre for Law and Research International (CLARION) P.O Box 46991 00100 Nairobi, Kenya Printed by: Birds Printers, Office Stationery & Equipment Ltd. P.O Box 48238 00100 Nairobi Kenya __________________________ CONTENTS Acknowledgement...............................................................iii Preface.......................................................................iv SECTION ONE: ACKNOWLEDGEMENT CLARION acknowledges the assistance of the following persons in preparation of this report: Morris Odhiambo Gachukia Nyaga Jackson Mwalulu Ife Matoya Kivutha Kibwana Smokin Wanjala Lawrence Mute Hussein Khalid Winnie Nyawira Sammy Wambua This publication was made possible with the kind financial assistance of the Danish International Development Agencey (DANIDA) PREFACE The big picture of corruption in present Kenya tells us that corruption is so endemic that it will require extraordinary action to reduce it to manageable levels. The small picture too tells us as important a story. Grand corruption, which is manifested by grand looting of state coffers has to be understood alongside the ostensible "small time" corruption, which is the continual everyday affliction of ordinary citizens. This report provides instances of "big time" as well as "small time" corruption. Corruption in relation to land has in the last many years affected a great number of poor Kenyans who merely wished to be left alone to till or graze their one or two acres of land. This report uses Mikilulo Ranch in Kibwezi to show how powerful people already owning huge tracts of land have employed a combination of politics, law and pure brute force to leave many Kenyans landless. The question, then, becomes whether and how these Kenyans will be compensated and whether and how land grabbers will be brought to book. As Kenya's anti-corruption institutions (whether they be the courts or the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority) continue to be ineffectual or in limbo, these are questions, which obviously require quick answers. This report also makes comment on the state of corruption in Nairobi City Council as well as exploring lessons, which Kenya can borrow from the relative presence or absence of corruption in other countries. Lawrence Mute Smokin Wanjala Kivutha Kibwana SECTION ONE: INCIDENCE OF REPORTED CASES OF CORRUPTION DURING THE PERIOD AUGUST-OCTOBER 2000 The Report of the Parliamentary Anti-Corruption Select Committee1, the Anti-corruption and Economic Crimes Bill and the Mbogua Report2 on corruption at City Hall, dominated media debate on the vice during the period August-October 2000. As a matter of fact, the Anti-corruption and Economic Crimes Bill was a product of the Parliamentary Anti-Corruption Select Committee.3 The Kombo report, as the report of the Parliamentary Committee came to be popularly known (named after Hon. Musikari Kombo, the chairman of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Corruption and Webuye Member of Parliament), looked at incidences of corruption in Kenya holistically. The Mbogua team, on the other hand, looked at corruption specifically at City Hall. The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Bill was published by the Attorney-General Hon. Amos Wako following intense donor pressure on the KANU government to do something about rampant official theft as a sina qua non for aid resumption. While the merits and demerits of the Bill attracted substantial attention, what riveted public focus more is what has come to be known as the 'List of Shame'. This refers to the list of the personalities named by both the Kombo and Mbogua reports. These are mostly state/KANU operatives, their relatives and close friends, who have over the years looted public coffers and grabbed public land with impunity. The Kombo report borrowed heavily from the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), the Public Investments Committee (PIC) and the Auditor and Controller General reports. Still, it made a dramatic impact thanks to two factors: one, it was the product of the August House, by the August House. The parliamentary anti-corruption body was formed in 1998, following a successful motion moved by Hon. Kombo himself. Two, it reads like an inventory of who is who in President Daniel arap Moi's government. Minister for Tourism, Commerce and Industry, Nicholas Biwott, found himself cornered when his name, together with that of vice president George Saitoti, was linked with a Ksh850million Soya beans scandal. The story alleges that the two top government officials misled the government to invest in a soya beans processing factory at the Coast province against expert advice that the project was not viable. The project ended up in the long list of Kenya's white elephants. The report also named president Moi's son, Gideon Moi, in connection with duty evasion on imported Mercedes Benz cars amounting to Ksh30million. Minister for Water Development, Kipng'eno arap Ng'eny, was accused of fleecing the Kenya Posts and Telecommunication of Ksh86 million when he was the corporation's managing director in the '80s. Office of the President ministers Julius Sunkuli and William Ole Ntimama were mentioned in relation to cases of land grabbing. To rub it in, the Kombo team recommended that those named in the report be not only investigated and prosecuted by the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority (KACA), but also be barred from seeking and/or holding public office. However, during these times of a charged political atmosphere, the personalities named in the report chose to politicise the whole affair, reading succession politics and tribalism in the document. Once the media got hooked to this line of thought, the movers and shakers at the corridors of power proceeded to marshal parliament's support to dilute the Kombo report. The eighth parliament, thanks to the combined strength of both Kanu and NDP legislators, opted to delete the list of shame from the report. Matters were not helped by the fact that a significant number of the 222 MPs, among them members of the probe committee, either absented themselves or abstained when it came to voting. The voting was an event in itself4, and was accompanied by much name-calling; allegations of bribery right inside the chambers, and, to cap it all, a fistfight between two members. It also came to be seen as a KANU against opposition parties' affair, with the cooperation between the ruling party and the National Democratic Party taking a lot of flak. It is interesting that in deed, some NDP parliamentarians voted against the adoption of the report simply because of the cooperation/partnership business. It is even more interesting that the party's leader, Raila Odinga, opted to walk out of the House just before the vote. The ensuing public outcry was deafening, as Kenyans expressed shock that their representatives, watchdogs if you like, had turned around to endorse high level theft of public funds. Rangwe MP Shem Ochuodho, perhaps captured the public mood perfectly well when he characterised his colleagues who abstained as fence sitters and challenged them to tell Kenyans why they missed the crucial vote 1 The Parliamentary Anti-Corruption Select Committee was set up in 1998, following the passing by parliament of a resolution that was tabled by the Hon. Musikari Kombo the Member of Parliament for Webuye constituency. The text of the resolution read as follows: "THAT, while appreciating that the Government's effort to stamp out corruption both in public and private sectors and noting with concern that rampant corruption has become so pervasive that it threatens any further socio-economic development and the future of the country; aware that corruption has become so entrenched that the existing legal framework under the Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap. 65) and the Anti-Corruption Authority are not adequate to significantly reduce it or eradicate it; and noting further that corruption has kept away potential investors, and eroded the good image of Kenya; this House resolves to set up a Select Committee to study and investigate the causes, nature, extent and impact of corruption in Kenya; identify the key perpetrators and beneficiaries of corruption; recommend immediate effective measures to be taken against such individuals involved in corruption and recover public property corruptly appropriated by them and the enactment of a Bill to provide for stiff penalties on all corruption related offences..." (Report of the Parliamentary Anti-Corruption Authority, Vol.1 at p. 25) 2 The Mbogua Report was presented to the Local government Minister, Joseph Kamotho in March, 2000, but apparently the Minister was not keen on making its contents public. The Minister appointed the probe team to investigate corruption in the civic authority due to glaring inability to offer services to city residents. (See also Section 5 of this issue for a comprehensive insight into corrupt practices in the City Council) 3 The Parliamentary graft committee recommended the enactment of the Bill to repeal the existing Prevention of Corruption Act - Cap 65, Laws of Kenya - to "provide a comprehensive framework and more effective legal machinery" for dealing with corruption and economic crimes. The Bill also aimed at broadening the powers of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority (KACA), and establishing an Anti- Corruption and Economic Crimes Court, ostensibly to speed up the hearing of cases currently held up as a result of the backlog in the judiciary. 4 Thus The People Daily, 20 July, 2000, for instance, under the title: "The list of shame: How your MP voted" carried a report of how Members voted in this obviously controversial issue. According to the report those who voted for the adoption of the report excluding the list of shame included: George Anyona (KSC), the mover of the controversial amendments, Adhu Awiti (NDP), Peter Kyalo Kaindi (SDP), Otieno Kajwang (NDP), Jonesmus kikuyu (SDP). Others were Peter Odoyo, Paul Otita, Oloo Oyula, Maryam Matano, (all of NDP), Suleiman Shakombo (SPK), Elias Barre Shill and Adan Keynan Wehliye of Safina. The KANU MPs who voted against the motion were Nyachae, M.A. Galgallo, Cyrus Jirongo, Suleiman Kamolleh, Kipruto arap Kirwa, Peter Maundu, Odongo Away and Wyclife Osundwa. The rest of those who voted for the removal of the names include: Mohammed Affey, Amukowa Anangwe, Moody Awori, Mohammed Badawy, Nicholas Biwott, Yussuf Chanzu, Kiptum Choge, G.B.Galgallo, Bonaya Godana, Fred Gumo, S.Kajembe, F. Kalulu, J. Kalweo, A. Karauri, R. Kiluta and J.N. Kimkung. Others were R. Kitur, R. Kochalle, T. Kofa, H. Kosgey, J. Koske, F.K. Lagat, S.P. Lenges, J.T. Leting, C. Lomada, F. P. Lotodo, M. Madoka, J.K. Maizs, J.K. Marrirmoi, F.O. Masakhalia, D. Mbela, S. Mkalla, H.M. Mohammed, M.A. Mohamud, C. Mokku, E.T. Morogo, S. Muchilwa and Musalia Mudavadi. The motion was also endorsed by J.J. Mugala, D. Musila, S. K. Musyoka, M. Mwachai, J. Mwakalu, G. Ndambuki, K.A. Ng'eny, A. M. Nooru, S.K. Ntutu, E.M. Ntwiga, J.W.N. Nyaga, F. Nyenze, C. Okemo, S.K. Rotich, I. Ruto and Saitoti. Legislators M.H. Salim, John Sambu, W.R. Samoei, K.M. Sang, D. Sankori, A.T. Sasura, I.A. Shaaban, M. Shidiye, M.C. Sirma, D.K.S. Sudi, J. Sunkuli, A. H. Wako, J.P. Wamukoya, Yussuf Haji, J.J. Kamotho, Z. Kittony and Mark Too also supported the removal of the names. Those who resisted the removal of the names include: Owino Acholla, Peter Oloo Aringo, W.O. Ayoki, J. Donde, N. Gatabaki, P.G. Gitonga, Ngenye Kariuki, M. Karua, N.Kathangu, M. Katuku, M. Kereri, D. Khamasi, Mwai Kibaki, J. Kibicho, and P. Kihara. Others were: M. Kituyi, M. Kiunjuri, M. Kombo, N. Kulundu, E. Magara, C. Mbitiru, M. Michuki, P. Mageke, B. Mugo, J. Munyasia, J. Muihia, P. Muiruri, D. Murathe, C. Murungaru, K.M. Muriuki, D.M. Mutahi, P.G. muya, O.K. Mwangi, D. Mwiraria and A.M. Nderitu. Charity Ngilu, P.N. Ndigwa, D.M. Njuki, H.O. Obwocha, W.O. Omamo, James Orengo, Soita Shitanda, L. Sifuna, G. Sunguh, J.N. Toro, A.M.W. Wamunyinyi, M. Waithaka, M. Wamae, Kijana Wamalwa, R.B.S. Wanjala, N.M. Wekesa, J.K. Munyao, P.A. Nyong'o and Tabitha Seii, also resisted the removal of the names. The deputy speaker, Job Omino did not vote either way since he was in the chair, though he could have been called to vote either way in the event of a tie. The remaining 73 MPs failed to turn up for the vote, with some walking out only moments before the voting time. Raila Odinga, the NDP leader, whose party is cooperating with the ruling party KANU, is one of those who walked out before taking the vote *************** George Ayittey,

THESE ARE THE REAL PIGS OF CORRUPTION

Kenyan MPs work for an average of 90 days a year, which is far less than any other professionals in the world. This year, Parliament was scheduled to be in session for only 24 weeks, meaning MPs spent the bulk of the year on holiday, despite being among the highest paid cadre of workers. But proposed new rules, which could come into force after the current Parliamentary session, could change all that. Members of Parliament observe a minute of silence in honour of their colleagues who died in a plane crash in Marsabit early this year. Parliament reopens on Tuesday. File PictureThe rules would set Parliamentary sessions to run from February 1 to the end of November each year. This means MPs would have a three-month vacation, still considerably longer than that enjoyed by legislators elsewhere. Congressmen in the US, for example, are entitled to only three weeks holiday every year. Currently, the Parliamentary calendar runs for between 23 to 28 weeks, with sessions being held for only three days each week. Kenyan Parliament based on British model Said former Butere MP, Mr Martin Shikuku: "It is a complete absurdity for our MPs to spend all their time on vacation. The West is way ahead of us economically. To catch up with them, we need to work harder, not spend all our time resting. This system has to change." The Kenyan Parliament is based on Britain’s Westminster model. And the system allows for generous holidays for members and an exceptionally lax working schedule. MPs sit only on Tuesday and Thursday afternoons and work a full day on Wednesday. This translates into a 15-and-a-half hour working week. British MPs, however, work a full day on Wednesday. This translates into a 15-and-a-half hour working week. British MPs, however, work longer hours than their Kenyan counterparts. Sessions in the UK sometimes go well past midnight and they can deliberate round the clock when there are crucial matters for discussion. The 15-and-a-half hour week for Kenyan MPs is far less than that of any other professionals in the country. Teachers and civil servants, for example, typically put in 56 hours of work every week. They are only entitled to 30 days holiday every year, in sharp contrast with legislators. Proposed minimum reforms This system could finally be changed before the end of November. Under a package of changes originally drafted by Nominated MP Mr Oloo Aringo and later incorporated into a Bill tabled in the House by MP Mr Charles Keter, Parliament would take control of the House Business calendar from the President. A key proposal would be to ensure Parliament stays in session longer than it does currently. The changes, however, would be packaged in the proposed minimum reforms to be tabled by the Parliamentary Committee on Administration of Justice and Legal Affairs, chaired by Kabete MP Mr Paul Muite. The Government side views these changes with suspicion, however, and it is unclear whether consensus would be found on the reforms package. On Monday, both the Government of National Unity and the Opposition Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya held separate meetings in readiness for what is expected to be a highly charged and divisive session. The minimum reforms package, which contains the new rules on drawing up the House Business calendar, is expected to provide the most intense debate. More months spent on recess than in session According to Aringo, Parliament must pass the reforms if the institution is to retain credibility as an avenue for passing legislation. "The Executive is suspicious of a critical Parliament. That’s why it is in the President’s interest to keep Parliament on recess for as long as possible. This has to change. We must control our own calendar. That way, no one will hold an axe over our heads with the threat of dissolving Parliament," said Aringo. He said it was a disgrace to have Parliament spend more months on recess than in session, and argued taxpayers would benefit from a Legislature that stayed in session longer. The Kenyan Parliament is one of the least effective on the continent. Tanzania’s Parliament passes an average of 40 Bills every year while the Ugandan Parliament passes up to 60 Bills annually. Kenyan MPs, who are the best paid in the region, only pass about 12 Bills every year, most of them mandatory Finance Bills. Record of MPs is dismal One reason advanced for the fact that they do not stay in session longer is the break set aside for committee work. The record of MPs at these sessions is, however, dismal and few yield any meaningful legislation. The low productivity of MPs, said former Law Society of Kenya chairman Mr Ahmednasir Abdullahi, raised the question whether the bar for eligibility for MPs should be raised higher than only requiring one to demonstrate literacy. "When you look at the work rate and prominence of such committees as the foreign affairs committee in places like the UK, for example, you realise how toothless our Legislature is as an organ of checking the Executive," he said. "We have developed a culture that if one is to prosper, they have to loot. Parliament has, therefore, been reduced to an institution whose main role is generating then protecting corruption rather than generating legislation." According to Shikuku, a wholesale revision of House rules is long overdue. He would like to see a system where MPs work longer hours. Political scene sharply divided The threshold for quorum should also be raised to at least a quarter of the number of members to avoid a situation where Bills are sometimes passed by as few as 12 MPs. MPs, in addition, should be required to clock in and out, to check against "technical appearances" in the House, a practice made famous by former Opposition leader, Mr Kenneth Matiba. Matiba would only appear in the House for a few seconds to avoid running afoul of House rules, which state that a member loses his/her seat if he/she fails to attend eight consecutive sittings. Matiba’s actions, however, were a protest against what he saw as the illegitimacy of the first multi-party Parliament rather than a product of laziness. With the political scene sharply divided in the run-up to the General Election, it remains to be seen whether Parliamentarians would accept the proposed new rules for setting their calendar, which would see them work a bit harder to earn their hefty remuneration package. Send to friend Print friendly

THE HARD TRUTH CONCERNING THE LONDON MEETING

Why ODM-Kenya Aborted London Meeting There is plenty of evidence that not everybody at ODM-Kenya is pulling in the same direction. For starters there are the conflicting statements that came out about the planned London trip that has now been cancelled.At first we were told that it was bonding trip so that the party high command can agree on their presidential candidate without self-destructing. Yesterday we were told that the ODM-Kenya team had a full itinerary and bonding sessions would virtually be impossible.The two Kenyan dailies, namely the Nation and the Standard have covered the latest developments in different angle probably reflecting on which side of the divide top editors at the dailies fall. The Standard says the meeting has been cancelled but the Daily Nation says that both Uhuru and Kalonzo amongst others will skip the London rendezvous.It is clear to this writer that the original session involving most of the ODM-Kenya presidential aspirants has been called off.But then there is the question of whether everybody's input was involved in the cancellation of the trip because others went ahead with travel plans. Acting secretary general Anyang Nyongo traveled to London from Nairobi last night while Raila Odinga who was in the United States made his way there from Florida.Insiders whisper that the real reason why the trip was called off was because it was being heavily financed by Gilbert "Miracle babies" Deya. Deya while denying the financing side says that he has been heavily involved in the organization of the trip and posed the question to a journalist yesterday via telephone; "What is wrong with that?"Apparently some self-righteous ODM luminaries felt that the trip was a PR disaster if the main organizer was going to be Deya. Or was somebody trying to slight Raila Odinga who is said to be very close to the miracle babies bishop? This blogger has had evidence of a relationship of sorts between Deya and one Kalonzo Musyoka, (see this photo that was posted on the web long before the miracle babies saga came to light). If you want to see where the photo was originally posted online (click HERE)It seems that the Bishop is playing politics to help him stay out of prison—at least Kenyan prisons that is, which is nothing new, a vast majority of Kenyan politicians have successfully used this strategy for years now.But even stranger is the fact that those talking about the possible PR disaster of a Deya-organized trip have done things that are equally criminal, if not more so because of the huge number of Kenyans that will be affected for a very long time by their actions of sheer greed.Even more interesting is the fact that the British government is now slowly tightening the noose in shutting out persons who have been involved in corruption and mega scandals I the past from entering Britain. Which raises yet another even more interesting question; what would happen if Kenyans elected a president who can't get a visa to enter Britain?If it was up to this blogger, I would have used getting to London as part of the elimination process for the ODM presidential candidate nomination. That would have easily cut down the number dramatically because the chances of the following ODM presidential candidates getting a visa to enter Britain are very slim indeed; William "YK92" Ruto, Musalia "Goldenberg" Mudavadi, Mutula "Various corrupt mega deals" Kilonzo.Interestingly Ruto was lucky enough to have been granted a visa last year, but the noose is now rapidly tightening and chances are that by the end of the year half the guys most Kenyans are rooting for president (in both ODM and Narc-Kenya may not be able to get a Visa to enter most European countries and the United States. Some presidential candidates we have in Kenya. Urgent Personal Message To You From Kumekucha Weekend special: Kenyan beauty complains to Kumekucha about her Kikuyu lovers. posted by chris at 1:16 AM 3 Comments: Anonymous said... Chris,There is this unsubsantiated story I have heard that the ODM-K spokesperson made a mountain of money (the fee apparently ran in to hundreds of millions of shillings) by helping the late Nigerian dictator, Sani Abacha's family launder their legendary petro-dollars... heard that one? 2:34 AM Anonymous said... Chris, I have alot of respect for politics as a shapers of the public that we live in. The ODM rally in London was a non-starter in the first place. Look at the ODM set-up in London. Are they some nonentities in kenya politics who were just hungry for publicity? They have been collecting money from people willing to attend. ODM is not even a registered association under the Charities Commission, anybody willing to crush it needs no effort. They are collecting money clandestinely!I said it last week in London and I was called all names. Most of then obscene to print.Then Deya. When Raila Odinga was in London in October, I said it and even told him personally that it was a PR disaster to have been entertained by Gilbert Deya. It was also unfortunate that he went and knelt at the Gilbert Deya Ministries to be prayed for and 'anointed' as the next Kenyan president. Now, it was the disaster that was waiting to happen that it came from a very different source, proves many right. It is true that Deya is playing politics to avoid being deported by hugging the opposition politicians and secondly trying to avoid charges when Raila becomes president. It is unclean to associate with Deya.Politicians you hear? That is why the trip was going to fail and wait for the after-shocks. After all those who pay for these events are mostly supporting NARC-K openly. They will be devastating!!! 7:02 AM Taabu said... ODM-K's London trip that never was is just the miracle that Kenyans needed to unearth the quicksand on which they anchor their political hopes. Right from the organizers to the guests, the whole thing was a disaster that occured before its conception. They had danced themselves lame before the music started and now all they to show for it is tonnes of eggs splashed on their faces. Shame on them.Behind this facade lurks the unpleasant Kenyan culture of aspiring to belong to a class, political and/or economic/social. The ODM-K leaders wanted to set themselves a side as special Kenyans whose self-manufactured problems can only be solved within earshot of the queen. Speak of colonial mindset. These are chaps out of touch with reality wasting funds that they would better invest in saving lives of starving Kenyans. But alas, you can't preach to the converted, can you?Seeing Kalonzo bandying high-sounding words in accusing unknown shadows who have hijacked ODM-K betrays his lyrical waxing las weekend in Western when he chose to prematurely offer unsolicited news on the London bonding.Boy, don't sharks have a sharp nose for blood? Trust Deya to smell an opportunity a mile a way to invest in prospective immunity. Mudavadi deserves a medal for being prophetic to cleverly evade embarassment - he knew he had no chance and Ruto can't put a spin on the backlash. ODM-K leadership must sober up and stop being let by the nose with euphoria and emotions. A deep reflection would have prompted them to soul-search to see the embarassment in advance. Now they have been hangen out both individually and severally to dry. Product of premature campaign and plastic confidence? We need not bother nor wait for time to tell. They have fattally shot themselves in the foot and their goose is as good as cooked and digested. 8:01 AM

FUNNY FUNNY!!!

Doctor : What happened to your arm? Oludhe : I broke it. Doctor : Where and How did that happen? Oludhe : Okey. It was a normal Saturdayafternoon.I was on the secondfloor balcony of that my house in Karen, not the one in Lavington sip... Doctor : Is that where you broke your arm,the balcony? Oludhe : No no ... I was sipping that my scotchwhisky slowly... you know my son recently came from the UK and he brought me some blue label. Anyway... as I continued sipping, I realised thatthe sun's rays were not getting directly to me, as the satellite dish was blocking them.Before I could instruct the domestic engineer to automatically turn awaythe dish, my butler James came up the balcony and informed me that there was this call on my social cellular phone . I reminded him to always bring the cellular up instead of calling me. As Ihurried down the marble escalator ... Doctor : I guess that is when you... Oludhe : No, as I was going down I noticed the garage door was open and a car alarm was on. I stopped to check and indeed the new model Prado was missing. I knew Mama Akinyi my beautifulsecondwife had taken it. Akinyi is our second daughter, now in Boston USA andis named after my late grand mother, who passed away in 1972 after a sort illness. I havealways warned Mama Akinyi never to use the 4 by 4 on weekends, because of the recent spate of car-jackings. I alwaysadvise her to either use the Mercedes 230E or the BMW 325I which are notvery attractive for thugs. That reminds me, I will have to tell mysecretary to call "car-track " first thing on Monday - Jowa! I need to update my mobility inventory with them.So as I was saying.... Doctor : (With some laughter) Yes Mr Oluthe, car theft incidences are rising and it is becoming a dangerous place. But how did you break your arm? Oludhe : Yes I was coming to that. On my way to pick the cell tel I heard a hissing sound. I stopped to check where it was coming from. Ahh,it was from the bathroom. Mama Akinyi, for some reason, had left theJacuzzi on. Luckily the temp and speed were at the minimum. I usually recommend such speed and temp so that we do not overload the UPS support system , especially when our son's home theatre system is on . Doctor : Mr Olu... Oludhe : Just wait... So I when I picked up the phone, I said Hello, Hello...Hello, but nothing. I became upset becauseI think the caller from state house had disconnected, I cant understand why he didn't leave a message after the beep.All my un-answered calls including the car mobiles are automatically redirected to a CAMS system. Doc, a CAMS is a"Central Answering Machine System". Anyway, on my way back I did notnotice the protruding wire from the satellite dish.I had on many occasions told MultiChoice to send in a qualified technician ... Doctor : ...is that where you tripped? Oludhe : No, as I was avoiding the wire, I tripped on theMultichoice 250 channel decoder and fell on the 200 year old classical familypiano.......... Doctor : Thank you. Such an expensive trip will cost you only 850. Oludhe: hands over the money excitedly...) Doctor: Not Kenya shillings, Dollars! Oludhe : Aii....yawa.....then I shall write you a cheque drawn from my overseas account with Fast Boston Bank Massachussets....you can not go wrong on that one omera.

THIS STORY IS SIMILAR TO THE LAND OF KAFIRA NOVEL

PRELUDE The events below are based on factual happenings thattook place in the years 2003 and 2004. Names,locations and dates have either been altered or arealtogether fictitious, because the matter is due incourt any time in the year 2007. The key suspects wereapprehended: one is out on bail, while the otherjumped bail. The suspects confessed to everything onthe night of their arrest.The victim received full compensation of US $ 750,000.For further guiding references, see story headlined"Police seek Briton who jumped bail", on the back pageof the Daily Nation of Tuesday, 15th March 2005(www.nationmedia.com), and story headlined "Trader'smove to end theft case flops", on page 14 of theStandard of the same date i.e. Tuesday, 15th March2005 (www.eastandard.net)The matter is very interesting, and is of globalpublic interest.Read on PART I- SURVEILLANCE On September 11th 2003 a Goan who introduced himselfas David Pereira came to the Harare offices of TransOceanic Plantations (Caribbean, Americas, Asia,Africa, New Zealand), known in short as TOP-CAAAN, andasked to see me, David Sentwana, regarding ashareholding transfer. TOP-CAAAN as it’s namesuggests, has interests in sugar, coffee, tea andcocoa in the Caribbean, the Americas, Asia, Africa andNew Zealand, and has been in operation for 55 yearsnow. I joined TOP-CAAAN as a management trainee inmid-1999 and had just completed 4 years of service. Iwas attached to the TOP-CAAAN share registry office asa relationship officer at the time of Mr. Pereira’svisit and therefore found nothing strange in beingasked for, even though there existed a registry frontoffice. I remember the exact date of Mr. Pereira’sfirst visit because I had just come from a dentist’sappointment to get a filling for one of my molars.David Pereira was a pleasant heavily built and darkskinned Asian and his mannerisms easily revealed thathe was born and brought up in Zimbabwe. I invited Mr.Pereira into the interview room where we brieflyengaged in pleasantries and dull banter about how weboth shared the same first name. Thereafter Mr.Pereira produced a TOP-CAAAN share certificate whichbore the names Stephen Benedict Pereira, which he saidbelonged to his late father, and which his motherdiscovered two years previously while unpacking,following the family’s relocation to South Africa. Thefamily, according to Mr. Pereira, had since put thematter aside pending the visit of a close familymember to Zimbabwe. Mr. Pereira further told me thathis family did not treat the matter as urgent as theentire estate of his late father had already beentransferred to his mother, and regarded the discoveryof the TOP-CAAAN share certificate as a minoromission. Moreover, the shareholding was for a smallamount of 50 shares valued then at US $ 140. Since hewas in Zimbabwe on other business, he had decided tocheck on the small unfinished business of theTOP-CAAAN shareholding in the name of his late father.I took one look at the aged share certificate andcould immediately tell that it was generated manyyears earlier when TOP-CAAAN was known as NorthernRhodesia Plantations and Mining (NRPM) and was basedin Zambia (then known as Northern Rhodesia). Whileintroducing the subject Mr. Pereira had mentioned thathis father once worked for a tour company in theZambian copper-belt, and it was probably at this timethat he acquired the shareholding. The date ofacquisition on the share certificate was 25th March1959.I checked the office database and did not find aTOP-CAAAN shareholding in the name of Stephen BenedictPereira which was not odd in such old cases related toNRPM. I however told Mr. Pereira that I would run acheck on the share certificate at the Harare CentralRegistry (HCR) where manual records relating to thenow defunct Northern Rhodesia Plantations and Miningwere held, and give him an answer in two days. I toldMr. Pereira that it appeared that the sharecertificate in his hands had likely been reported lostyears ago and a replacement issued. His father musthave then sold the replacement, only for his family todiscover the misplaced share certificate years later.Such cases were relatively common, but I neverthelesstold Mr. Pereira to await formal confirmation from HCRin the next two days. Mr. Pereira was not opposed tothis as he was going to be in the country for anotherthree weeks. He left me with his local cell phonenumber to enable me notify him when HCR came up withan answer.There was a slight delay from HCR and they got back tous on 17th September 2003. As anticipated, records atHCR indicated that the share certificate of 50 sharesshown to me by Mr. Pereira had been reported lost on17th May 1977 and a replacement issued on 14th June1977. Replacement share certificate No. TOP-CAAANA40554 for 50 shares was then sold with other bonusesbelonging to Stephen Benedict Pereira amounting to 400shares, on 16th October 1984. Embarrassed at the delayand at my assurance that it would not take not morethan two days, I immediately called Mr. Pereira tonotify him of the findings and apologize for thedelay. Mr. Pereira took no offence and was in fact veryappreciative of my efforts, so appreciative that hewanted to buy me a drink. I declined the offer tellinghim that it was not necessary. Mr. Pereira howeverinsisted that he would feel bad if he didn’t show hisappreciation to me for me treating him so well. Ithought about the likely implications for a briefmoment, and then accepted Mr. Pereira’s offer to buyme a drink, not sensing any ulterior motive and notwanting to offend him. Mr. Pereira was glad at myacceptance and said that he would call me in thecoming week for us to arrange a date and a time. Heasked for my cell phone number, but I instead gave himthe office number.Sure enough, Mr. Pereira called me first thing onMonday morning, 22nd September 2003, and proposed thatwe meet on Wednesday, 24th September 2003 at 6.00 p.m.at the elite Zambezi Cavern on the outskirts ofHarare. I agreed to this because I regularlyentertained valued TOP-CAAAN clients at the ZambeziCavern and knew it very well, and because of it’sproximity to the Tutwane suburb, where I resided. Mr.Pereira’s promptness at arranging the meeting didhowever make me curious and thoughts of him being ahomosexual and wanting to go to bed with me did crossmy mind at this stage. If this was so, I intended tobrush him off in a firm but civil manner, in the sameway that I handled a similar situation eight yearsearlier, while a student at Illinois State Universityin the USA. I drove to the Zambezi Cavern on Wednesday, 24thSeptember 2003, and arrived some minutes before 6.00p.m. to find Mr. Pereira eagerly waiting for me. TheZambezi Cavern had been a whites only establishmentbefore independence and still retained symbols of thecolonial era such as the life size portrait of thelast colonial premier, Ian Smith, that hang in thedisused billiards room. For some peculiar reason, thisnever bothered the sizable and growing number ofblacks that continued to patronize the Zambezi Cavernsince independence 23 years earlier. Blacks probablyregarded it as a sign of conquest for Ian Smith’sportrait to behold. I say this because despite beingblack, I didn’t identify much with the Zambezi Cavernand didn’t care much about it either, treating it moreas an ideal location for entertaining valued TOP-CAAANclients under my customer care portfolio. I quietfrankly spent very limited of my personal time at theZambezi Tavern, preferring numerous other Harareestablishments that did not have a tag, where I couldfreely be myself.Mr. Pereira welcomed me warmly and we got round todiscussion on a wide number of topics ranging frombusiness, politics, and sports, to women,relationships, and sex, invariably. He ordered asumptuous meal of roast goat meat, fried vegetablesand grilled potatoes dressed with the trademarkZambezi Cavern sauces. We both downed the meal withgusto. Mr. Pereira, who henceforth asked me to callhim Dave, also put me at ease by freely and fluentlyconversing in ‘Ndeshoeng’, a dialect derived fromNdebele, Shona and English, and mainly associated withblack rebellious youth of post-independent Zimbabwe.It was extremely rare for Asians and Whites inZimbabwe to speak Ndeshoeng and considered Dave arogue Asian, telling him as much. Dave laughedheartily, saying that I had made an accurateobservation. I myself had never really cared aboutNdeshoeng or been fluent in it either, but thischanged after I jointly formed and became part of arap group called ‘Sunset’, soon after my return fromthe states in mid-1997.Dave ordered a bottle of the best champagne in thehouse to down our meal as we engaged in further livelydiscussion. I was in a good mood as much as Dave was,but I could tell at this point that our meeting wasmore than a token of appreciation, more even than theseduction of a heterosexual by a homosexual. PART II – ENGAGEMENT As the evening wore on and the champagne took effect,Dave gathered the courage to tell me what our meetingwas all about. He said that the he was aware that hislate father had sold his shares in TOP-CAAAN way backin 1984, having found this out slightly before Ijoined TOP-CAAAN in mid-1999. Dave, in his words, hadtherefore taken the trouble of making contact with mefor a different reason, something much bigger andsomething that would possibly interest me. He told methat he had been given my name by an undisclosedreference, who was confident of a key role I couldplay in assisting a lucrative venture. Dave told methat he and his unnamed associates were aware oflucrative, sizable and dormant shareholdings inTOP-CAAAN that were acquired several years earlierwhen TOP-CAAAN traded as Northern Rhodesia Plantationsand Mining (NRPM). These were mainly registered in thename of Whites and Asians, who were either deceased orhad left Northern Rhodesia in a panicky huff, fearfulof reprisals from the incoming Black government ofindependent Zambia under President Kenneth Kaunda.Dave said that ‘we’ could take advantage of suchdormant accounts through fraudulent share sales on theHarare Stock Exchange (HSE). The risks were minimaland the returns high, given that the owners of thetargeted accounts, if still be alive, were scatteredin North America, Europe, the Middle East, the FarEast, the Indian sub-continent, Goa and Oceania, withno intentions of ever coming back to Zambia orZimbabwe. The Trustees of Estates of deceasedTOP-CAAAN shareholders were probably less aware of theshareholdings, as Northern Rhodesia Plantations andMining (NRPM), had started of as a small remoteconcern with a shaky shareholding, and a dim future.Against all odds however, NRPM had grown into theprofitable TOP-CAAAN of today, and had made an abovenormal return to initial shareholders through numerousdividend payments and several bonus share issues. WhenNRPM was incorporated initially, it’s shares cost nomore than a few US cents, but now traded at the highHSE mean price of US $ 6 per share.All this came as shocking news to me. Perhaps I wasready to right off all that Dave was telling me untilhe dropped the ultimate shocker. Dave told me thatthey had already executed a successful fraudulenttransaction worth US $ 230,000 right under our nosesand without detection. I believe that the alcohol inme at that moment simply evaporated. Dave told me theymanaged their successful criminal undertaking inFebruary 2003. He further told me that my role wouldbe to search the TOP-CAAAN share register for dormantaccounts. The way to determine this would be throughidentifying accounts that had unclaimed dividendpayments over a period of 15 to 40 years. Dave saidthat the bigger the value of a dormant account Iidentified the better, telling me to target dormantaccounts with values ranging from US $ 600,000 to US $900,000, or bigger if possible. Dave said that myreward for this would be a very generous and I wouldbe able to fulfill all my wildest dreams. Dave howevertold me that I needed to make a quick decision onwhether I wanted to join or not. Dave kept repeatingthat chances of detection would be minimal and thatany trail would promptly be destroyed. Dave said thatif I decided in, then I would need to notify ‘them’soon to enable effective planning. Dave did howevermention the existence of White in the scam calledRichard. Dave would front for a dormant Asian ownedshareholding, while Richard would front for a dormantWhite owned shareholding in the books of TOP-CAAAN.Whites and Asians in Zimbabwe still benefited heavilyfrom a privileged status, and their dealings wereseldom questioned. Dave said that ‘we’ needed to fullyexploit this bias. A White or Asian in Zimbabwe couldvery easily open an account of US $ 100,000 withoutdrawing questions, as opposed to a Black like me. Toally my fears, Dave said that this would be resolvedthrough very dependable contacts he had in theBulawayo branch of National Bank of Zimbabwe (NBZ),who would easily enable me open an account of US $100,000 or US $ 200,000, depending on the size of thejob. The cash transactions of the February 2003mentioned to me by Dave, had actually been processedthrough NBZ, Bulawayo, according to Dave. Dave told methat Richard was based in South Africa, where heactually was currently, and a meeting could bearranged between the three of us in the next two weekstime if I agreed to join ‘them’. Dave told me that hewould call me the following week on Monday for myanswer.I sat there in shocked, bewildered and stupefiedsilence all the time I was being told this. I didn’tlet this show on my face though, and Dave must haveinterpreted this as a good sign of me doing thecalculations of gain in my head. We broke off at about10.00 p.m., Dave telling me that he was driving to hisroom at the Harare Sheraton, and me to my house inTutwane. I drove home in stone cold reflection thatnight, wondering what I had gotten myself into and howto handle it. I clearly realized that the choices Ihad were not easy. Joining ‘them’ in the dead-endcareer of crime was out of the question for me and Iruled this out. What worried me though was that‘these’ people knew me ‘well’ and had conferred beforeapproaching me. They could come for me and finish meif I turned them in and this concerned me. I couldalso simply tell Dave that I did not want to haveanything to do with their wretched schemes, turn ablind eye and keep quiet about the whole thing withouttelling a soul. This would however also beirresponsible, unforgivable and criminal in thehighest degree, and would have made me an accessory toa crime or crimes. In a curious and twisted way, Iwould end up a criminal if I decided to join ‘them’,or if I held back from joining ‘them’. There were alsorisks in simply making the right decision and turningin Dave and his associates to the authorities. Suchwas the difficult predicament that I faced. I didn’tworry much about who might have referred Dave & Co. tome, because I was an outgoing person who as mentioned,had even jointly formed and been part of a rap groupcalled ‘Sunset’. Five Years after ‘Sunset’ folded upand four years after working at TOP-CAAAN, there werestill people in Harare who recognized me more for“Sunset’, than for TOP-CAAAN. PART III – EXECUTION I woke up the following morning still confused andstill hoping that my meeting with Dave the previousevening was just a figment of my imagination, a dream.I prepared to go to work all the time reflecting onhow to deal with the situation I now found myself in.I got to work as usual at 7.00 a.m., read the two mainHarare dailies, prepared myself a cup of coffee anddrank it as I finalized a report on TOP-CAAAN’sexpansion of operations to the East African region ofTanzania, Uganda and Kenya. I never ordinarily didtasks of this nature but the head of TOP-CAAANoperations had asked me to do it for her as a favor.The office secretary, Deborah, came in as usual at7.30 a.m. teased me momentarily as usual, and thenwent to her desk. Deborah was very fond of me,probably because ‘Sunset’ were a hit when she was inhigh school. At about 8.30 a.m., I called my estrangedwife Theresa to chat. Theresa worked for the Coca ColaCompany in Zimbabwe as a marketing executive. We hadmet four years ago at a public relations workshop forkey corporations in Zimbabwe, courted for a year, weremarried for two, and separated for the last one,typical of youth marriages nowadays in Zimbabwe.Theresa could tell something was wrong, because I onlycalled her at that time of the morning when somethingwas wrong. I almost told her what I was calling herabout, but hesitated because of her penchant fordrama. I could almost be sure of seeing what I toldher on the 6 o’clock news that evening. I instead toldher that I had developed butterflies about enrollingfor an MBA at Harare University and neededencouragement, which Theresa was good at. Sheencouraged me on not knowing why I had called herabout in the first place. I however decided to keep mymeeting with Dave to myself until I was certain thatwhat he told me on the evening of 24th September 2003was not designed to start a wild goose chase.I spent the rest of the week and weekend in my usualmood doing the usual things. No one close to menoticed any significant change in my mood which Iconsidered positive. From this point on however, Idecided to carefully detail any dealings I would havewith Dave or anyone linked to him. Dave called me at 10.00 a.m. on Monday morning, 29thSeptember 2003 and was very pleasant as usual. Afterthe pleasantries, Dave asked me if I had made adecision on the matter we had discussed and I toldDave that I first needed to meet him and Richardtogether before making a decision. Dave was delightedto hear this, considering it a positive answer. Davesuggested that the three of us could meet at theVictoria Falls Hotel on the border of Zimbabwe andZambia the coming weekend and I told him that this wasridiculous. Dave loves the fast life and I wasn’t surewhether he was serious or joking. Either way, I wasn’tmaking a trip to the border at such short notice. Davelaughed and shrugged it off, and said that he wouldarrange a meeting for the three of us the comingFriday, 3rd October 2003, at the HotelIntercontinental, Harare. Dave called me again onWednesday, 1st October 2003 to confirm whether ourmeeting of Friday was still on and I respondedaffirmatively. Dave told me that he and Richard wouldbe at the Hotel Intercontinental, Harare, at 6.00 p.m.I arrived at the Intercontinental at 6.05 p.m. onFriday, 3rd October 2003 and found Dave and Richardwaiting for me at the lobby. Dave introduced me toRichard as David Sentwana and he to me as RichardJeremy Martin. Richard told me that his friends calledhim RJ and he therefore wanted me to call him RJ. Daveand RJ were certainly determined to induce camaraderieas quickly as possible. After the introduction, Daveand RJ suggested that we take a table in the secludedGazelle restaurant. RJ ordered three cold beers, Mvumalagers, for the three of us, before getting down tobusiness. RJ told me that he was an accountant bytraining and had worked for South African Breweriesfor several years, before resigning and venturing intothe tours and travel business in South Africa. He toldme his tour firm was called RJ tours and travel andhad been in operation for eight years. He and Dave hadknown each other for 12 years, having first met inMalawi where Dave was marketing his firm’s computersoftware products and RJ was doing feasibility studiesfor the establishment of a brewing plant in Malawi.Both their businesses were going through hard times in2002 when an undisclosed acquaintance of Dave’sintroduced the subject of dormant shareholdings atTOP-CAAAN. Dave’s undisclosed acquaintance was aformer employee of the Harare Central Registry (HCR).RJ says that he initially hesitated but bought inafter they sent a letter to TOP-CAAAN asking us tochange the postal address of a dormant accountprovided by the former employee of the Harare CentralRegistry (HCR). The former HCR employee provided thespecimen signature of the dormant account and Dave andRJ, arranged for the same to be forged on to the saidletter at a seedy down town Harare joint. Proof thattheir criminal venture had worked emerged when RJreceived a TOP-CAAAN dividend cheque at a Johannesburgpostal address he used for dubious dealings. Thedividend cheque was for US $ 10,000 and it is thismore than anything, that encouraged Dave and RJ on.Forged documents were prepared for RJ, and he usedthese to open an account at National Bank of Zimbabwe,Bulawayo, using Dave’s contacts. When the chequecleared and the monies withdrawn without a hitch, RJ,posing as the shareholder, then resorted tocorresponding with TOP-CAAAN, saying that he hadmisplaced his share certificate and wanted to beissued with a replacement. As mentioned, the enquiringshareholder was White and no objections were thereforeraised. The necessary replacement documents andindemnities were duly executed and RJ received areplacement share certificate after two months. RJ andDave thereafter arranged for a prompt sale of theshareholding through Maryland Stockbrokers of Harare.Dave acted as RJ’s appointed representative in allmatters by way of a written letter of authorization,and this aided in the smooth flow of matters.I told RJ and Dave that I appreciated this lengthy anddetailed background to their first successful job andwas encouraged enough to join them. Dave and RJ wereclearly elated with Dave proposing a toast at theentry of their latest recruit. It was about 9.45 p.m.when we toasted, having each had five beers each.After the toasting and hearty, elated conversation, Itold RJ and Dave that I was curious to know the nameof the victim. Dave and RJ hesitated briefly before RJtold me that it belonged to one Anthony StephenWilkinson. I then gave both Dave and RJ my cell phonenumber and RJ gave me his. Dave and RJ told me thatthey were both frequently in and out of Zimbabwe andeither one of them would make contact with me in thenext two weeks to establish progress made. We alsoagreed that we would henceforth primarily communicatethrough our cell phones. I parted ways with Dave andRJ at 10.00 a.m. and caught a taxi home as enginerepairs were still being done to my car. I was moreconfident on the night of 3rd October 2003 than I wason the night of 24th September 2003, because I couldnow approach my superiors with more concrete details.On Monday morning, 6th October 2003 I arrived at theoffice as usual at 7.00 a.m. skipped reading thepapers, and immediately logged on the network to checkthe TOP-CAAAN shareholding details of one AnthonyStephen Wilkinson. Sure enough, the entireshareholding of 78,000 shares was disposed of on 25thFebruary 2003. Prior to this, the shareholding postaladdress had been altered from Murrayfield Close, 22Sandra Street, Yorkshire NF4 NJ5, United Kingdom, toSisulu Drive, P.O. Box 45, Johannesburg, South Africaon 18th September 2002. The US $ 10,000 dividendcheque Dave and RJ told me was for the final yearended 30th June 2002, which fell due on 25th October2002. The dividend cheque was en cashed on 27thNovember 2002 according to our records. The magnitudeof what I was dealing with sunk in at that point. Iwas further mystified and perturbed by therecklessness of the people I was dealing with. Hadthey blown up US $ 230,000 in the short period of 7months, because the pair were eager that we get onwith a second job as quickly as possible?At precisely 8.06 a.m. on Monday, 6th October 2003, Icalled the TOP-CAAAN share registry head, KenMasatwana, and told him that I needed to see himimmediately about some highly sensitive information Ihad. Masatwana told me it was okay for me to go andsee him immediately. I spent about 40 minutes givingMasatwana graphic details of my encounter with Daveand RJ. Masatwana was in two words, shell shocked butremained calm and composed as was his trademark.Masatwana then called Deborah and asked her toimmediately fetch Anthony Stephen Wilkinson’s filefrom the basement safe that contained all shareholderrecords. As was the practice, Deborah went down to thebasement with one of the office duty guards, tocomplement the two basement guards posted there on afull time basis. Deborah could tell that something waswrong and this was clearly noticeable on her face.Meanwhile, Masatwana told me to go to my office as heconferred with the General Manager, TOP-CAAAN andTOP-CAAAN Plantation Security Unit (PSU). This I did.At 2.45 p.m. on Monday, 6th October 2003, Masatwanacalled me and asked me to go to his office which Idid. In it I found Masatwana and Senior Superintendentof Police (retired) Joshua Mudzurire, the dreaded headof TOP-CAAAN Plantation Security Unit (PSU). Mudzurirehad been head of TOP-CAAAN (PSU), for 11 years now,before which he had worked with both the ZimbabwePolice Force (ZPF), and the Zimbabwe Intelligence andSecurity Unit (ZISU). Mudzurire welcomed me warmly andput me at ease. He asked questions mainly related towork at TOP-CAAAN and my job profile, beforespecifically enquiring about Dave and RJ. He askedabout their appearance, mannerisms and cars theydrove. It appeared that Mudzurire was trying toestablish whether he could place Dave and RJ in hisdatabase. Mudzurire then told me that he and Masatwanahad met the General Manager TOP-CAAAN that morning anda decision to play along had been made. Theadministrative offices of Harare TOP-CAAAN wereactually housed in one sprawling complex located onthe western outskirts of Harare city. The five coffeeplantations proper were situated in the five provincesof Manicland, Mashonaland West, Masvingo, MatabelelandNorth, and Midlands. Mudzurire concluded by telling methat I was also scheduled to meet the Director of theZimbabwe Intelligence and Security Unit (ZISU), Col.(ret.) Arthur ‘Shomron’ Sexwale, at the ZISU officesthe following morning at 8.00 a.m. in the morning. Themagnitude of what I had gotten myself into keptsinking deeper and deeper.Col. Sexwale, head of ZISU, was a highly respectedfigure in the whole of Zimbabwe. Sexwale initiallyserved in the elite Chiredzi Battalion of the ZimbabweArmy (ZA), towards the end of which he attendedspecialised training in Israel. During his training inIsrael, it is said that Sexwale was partly under thesupervision of Brig. Dan Shomron, who headed thedaring and stunning rescue of Israeli hostages fromUganda’s Entebbe airport in 1976, hence his nickname‘Shomron’. On his return from Israel Sexwale helpedform ZISU and was the first head of it’s Scorpionunit. The nickname ‘Shomron’ held because it is saidthat Sexwale and Brig. Shomron had a liking for eachother, and because Sexwale in his own right,coordinated the demise of the dreaded drug cartel, Zimtriangle, in a four year period between 1982 and 1986that ended in a heavy exchange of fire betweenZimbabwe Security Forces and Zim Triangle on 18th May1986. The successful operation earned SexwalePresidential and Military citations. I couldn’tbelieve that I was going to have the honour of meetingSexwale, and that this matter was that serious.I arrived at the ZISU offices on Machel Street at 7.45a.m. on Tuesday, 7th October 2003 and went through thenormal security checks. It was clear that I was beingexpected because I was not subjected to any closescrutiny at all and was immediately led to Col.Sexwale’s fourth floor office. Sexwale like Mudzurirethe previous day, welcomed me warmly with a firmhandshake, offered me a seat and even personallypoured me a cup of TOP-CAAAN coffee. I couldn’tbelieve I was in the presence of the legendary Col.Arthur ‘Shomron’ Sexwale, and not nervous at that. Ieven told Sexwale that I still admired him greatly forcrushing Zim triangle, for which he thanked me,smiling mildly, shyly and reflectively. Sexwale didnot however waste time getting to the point. He toldme that TOP-CAAAN was very important to the economy ofZimbabwe, hence the seriousness with which this matterwas being treated. Quite a bit was at stake and thegovernment would certainly be displeased to hear aboutthe incident I had reported. Sexwale told me he wasdue to meet the Minister of Internal Security thatmorning on a different matter, but would not mentionthe incident I had reported until we had establishedgreater details. Sexwale told me that I would be thelinkman in reining in the suspects in an operation tobe coordinated by Company 13 of ZISU and TOP-CAAANPlantation Security Unit (PSU). Sexwale concluded bytelling me to be careful and return to the officewhere I would receive further briefing from Mudzurire.I returned back to the office and went straight toMasatwana’s office to give him details of my meetingwith Sexwale. Masatwana told me that he and Mudzurirewould work on identifying a dormant account and let meknow in due course. Meanwhile, Masatwana droppedanother bombshell and told me that TOP-CAAAN GeneralManager, Stanley Davidson, would be visiting the shareregistry that afternoon. Things appeared to be movingat a breathtaking pace.Davidson had been General Manager of TOP-CAAAN fortwenty years and was as no-nonsense as they come. Hisgrandfather Reverend Nicholas Hubert Davidson came toZimbabwe (then Southern Rhodesia), in 1921 and was keyin establishing the West Nicholson Elementary,Intermediate and Senior Schools, the West NicholsonPolytechnic and the West Nicholson Hospital, all inthe Matabeleland South province. Reverend Davidson andhis family were therefore highly respected inZimbabwe. His grandson, Stanley Davidson, was born,brought up and educated in West Nicholson. Stanley wasfluent in both Ndebele and Shona, and was regarded asthe representation of a true Zimbabwean, havingrefused to defect when President Mugabe took overleadership in April 1980. Many did not even regardDavidson as a White and he was even nicknamed‘Mzilikazi’, after the revered patriarch of theNdebele in Zimbabwe. On a personal note, Davidsonreminded me of my estranged wife Theresa, firm butmoody. Davidson’s meeting with TOP-CAAAN share registry staffwas scheduled for 5.30 p.m., 7th October 2003, afterformal office hours. Mudzurire was also in attendance.Masatwana was first to speak saying that thereappeared to have been a breach of serious magnitude atTOP-CAAAN share registry, which was likely to costTOP-CAAAN as a whole a lot of money. Masatwana saidthat action was already being taken and asked all ofus to exercise extra care and diligence in our duties.Masatwana did not however divulge any details.Davidson basically repeated what Masatwana had saidwith minor additions. We could all tell that he wassuppressing his fury, but he lapsed at one point byrevealing that he had always regarded us highly, butwas grateful that we had finally emerged in our truecolors as ‘thick Zimbabweans’. This was typical ofDavidson and no one took offence. He spoke to allworkers in this way regardless of their race. Davidsonhowever cautioned that he would spare no one found tohave deliberately facilitated the breach, and wedidn’t doubt him. The meeting concluded at 6.15 p.m.without Davidson speaking directly to me, though hemust have known my role in the matter. Mudzurire didnot speak and I gather he was on an intelligencegathering exercise. The mood among staff thereafterwas understandably one of confusion and anxiety,because very few of us were aware of what had actuallyhappened. Staff hurriedly gathered in multi-racialgroups and spoke in anxious whispers. Deborahtypically helped lighten up matters by saying that shewould supervise delivery of all office stationery tothe printers the following morning for the logo to bereplaced with the initials ‘TZ’. All of us looked atDeborah in bewilderment for a split second, before shereminded us that we were ‘thick Zimbabweans’, pickedup her handbag and walked towards the waiting staffvan. We all burst out in laughter. Deborah has wittycheek.Staff at TOP-CAAAN staff registry however got tobasically know what had happened over the followingtwo weeks. Masatwana cautioned us to keep the breachwithin ourselves in a supplementary meeting. Mudzurireappeared to believe that the breach did not directlyinvolve TOP-CAAAN share registry staff, and so he andPlantation Security Unit Staff largely centred theirinvestigations elsewhere. Masatwana however thoughtdifferently but did not openly show it. Towards the 17th of October 2003, Masatwana called meto his office, where I found him in the company ofMudzurire. Masatwana with Mudzurire’s approval, gaveme details of an account I was to give Dave and RJwhen they next made contact with me. The account wasin the name of one Fredrick Parker Smith of 22Foulkener Drive, Alice Springs, Australia. The accounthad a shareholding of 22,000 shares then valued atslightly over US $ 125,000 and additionally hadunclaimed dividends dating back to 1974 totaling US $25,000. Masatwana, Mudzurire and I agreed that thiswas sure to be attractive to Dave and RJ. Mudzuriretold me to regularly keep him informed on anydevelopments henceforth and gave me his cell phonenumber. This was important as this would also give himample time to notify Company 13 officers of ZISUattached to the case.RJ called me on my cell phone on Monday morning, 20thOctober 2003 and got to the point after limitedpleasantries. I told him I had identified anattractive dormant account. RJ was excited to hearthis and suggested that we meet at the lessconspicuous Harare Holiday Inn that evening. I toldhim that was fine and we agreed to meet at 6.00 p.m.that evening. After my conversation with RJ, Iimmediately called Mudzurire who was glad that Daveand RJ had made contact. Mudzurire said that he wouldarrange to be discreetly present at the Harare HolidayInn that evening with one or two Company 13 officers.I met RJ some minutes after 6.00 p.m. on Monday, 20thOctober 2003. RJ ordered the beers, after which Iimmediately gave RJ the details of Fredrick ParkerSmith’s shareholding. RJ was ecstatic saying that itfitted the profile perfectly, and said that we couldimmediately commence work on it. I took RJ one stepback and told him that I was disappointed to note thatAnthony Stephen Wilkinson’s shareholding which he andDave had fraudulently disposed of, reflected regularlycashed dividend payments. I asked him to explain this,as he and Dave had assured me of minimal risks. RJ wascleared stunned by this unexpected question and madeevery effort to calm my nerves. He admitted that heand Dave had not told me everything regarding AnthonyStephen Wilkinson’s shareholding. I feigned anger,disappointment and betrayal which RJ went to greatpains to dispel. RJ told me that the Anthony StephenWilkinson matter had been referred to him and Dave bythe still unnamed former employee of Harare CentralRegistry (HCR), which in turn had been referred to himby local Zimbabwean Whites who knew the family ofAnthony Stephen Wilkinson.He and Dave had then met the HCR man and theunidentified local Whites in a series of meetings toplot their criminal act. I told RJ that AnthonyStephen Wilkinson appeared to be alive which meantthat the matter would soon blow up. I asked how he,Dave and all other involved people, intended to dealwith this. RJ had no words. He admitted that he andDave had decided to de-link themselves from the HCRman and the unidentified local Whites, and start on afresh slate of crime. RJ told me that the AnthonyStephen Wilkinson saga was an eye-opener for him andDave, which had encouraged them to go it alone. Theyhoped to make between US $ 1 to 1.5 million and callit quits after that. What came to mind was that I wasdealing with amateurs who seemed to have a lot oftrust in me for one reason or another. I told RJ thatthe success of our criminal act depended on us beingopen with each other, and he fully agreed. He promisedthat he and Dave would no longer hold back anyinformation from me. I noted the presence of Mudzurireat the east end cafe at some point during mydiscussion with RJ and knew we were undersurveillance. RJ asked me if I could provide him withFredrick Parker Smith’s signature, and I told him togive him till Wednesday, 22nd October 2003, to arrangefor the same.RJ and I parted ways at 7.45 p.m. on Monday evening,20th October 2003. The tension that featured at thestart of the meeting fizzled out towards the end. Igot home at 8.05 p.m. and immediately calledMudzurire. Mudzurire told me that they were presentthroughout the entire duration of my meeting with RJ.He did not specify who ‘they’ were, but he must havemeant officers from ZISU Company 13. Mudzurire told mehe would be at the office first thing the followingmorning when I would have a chance to brief him ofwhat transpired in my meeting with RJ.The following morning, Tuesday, 21st October 2003 at8.10 a.m., Masatwana called me and asked me to go tohis office. I expectedly found Mudzurire eagerlywaiting for my verbal report. Both Masatwana andMudzurire listened to details of meeting with RJ withgreat intent without interrupting me, and this enabledme finish in about twelve minutes. Mudzurire stared atme briefly at the end, gave a heavy sigh, clamped hishands tightly together momentarily and said ‘thankyou, Sentwana’, in his characteristic sluggish deepvoice.Mudzurire told me that Masatwana would arrange for meto get a copy of Fredrick Parker Smith’s signature thefollowing morning to enable me deliver it to RJ.Mudzurire also told me to prepare a written report ofmy meeting with RJ of 21st October 2003. This would bethe third report I would be preparing having alreadyprepared two lengthy reports. I could tell intuitivelyfrom the kind of treatment I was getting lately fromcertain parts of the office, that I was regarded assuspect and party to the first fraudulent transaction.I could understand this, because I had not involvedanyone in the office initially, and notified theoffice after I had already had two meetings with Daveand one with RJ. I did not let this cloud my focushowever. It did get me thinking though. I realizedthat I hadn’t notified any close family member of mineas yet, regarding the matter, which could also provecostly in it’s own way. That evening, I sent adetailed e-mail to my older brother Kevin, in Nairobi,Kenya, where he works for the United NationsEnvironment Programme (UNEP). I made sure I used mypersonal Yahoo e-mail address and likewise, hispersonal Yahoo e-mail address.Kevin called me on my cell phone first thing thefollowing morning as I was preparing to leave my housein Tutwane. Kevin was very supportive andcongratulated me for alerting my superiors. He likeSexwale, also told me to be careful in my dealingswith Dave and RJ and told me to keep him regularlyupdated through e-mail inspite of the fact that itwasn’t full proof. He was also thrilled to hear that Ihad met Col. Sexwale.RJ called me at 9.15 a.m. on Wednesday morning, 22ndOctober 2003, to enquire whether I had acquired a copyof Fredrick Parker Smith’s signature, and I told himthat I had. He was elated and asked if we could alsomeet that evening at 6.00 p.m. at the Harare HolidayInn, which I accepted. I immediately called Mudzurireon his cell phone to alert him. Mudzurire asked me ifMasatwana had as yet given me a copy of FredrickParker Smith’s signature and I told him that hehadn’t. Mudzurire told me that he would arrange forthis in the next one hour. Sure enough, Masatwanacalled me to his office at 10.30 a.m. to give me acopy of Fredrick Parker Smith’s signature.At 5.45 p.m. on 22nd October 2003, I called Mudzurireon his cell phone to notify him that I was on my wayto meet RJ at the Harare Holiday Inn. Mudzurire toldme that they were actually already there awaiting bothme and RJ. I got to the Holiday Inn at 6.00 p.m. andfound RJ waiting for me. On this occasion we opted tohave coffee instead of beers, TOP-CAAAN coffee atthat. Whilst the coffee was being brought, I gave RJthe copy of Fredrick Parker Smith’s signature. RJ toldme that he intended to prepare a dummy letter toTOP-CAAAN from Fredrick Parker Smith saying that hehad changed his residence worldwide several times overthe past 30 years and was now settled in the UnitedKingdom. RJ’s letter would state that he i.e. FredrickParker Smith had stumbled upon some old documentationrelating to his shareholding in TOP-CAAAN and wastherefore writing to enquire on it’s status. This hadalso been further aided by him i.e. Fredrick ParkerSmith, continually hearing frequent and favorablemention of TOP-CAAAN performance on the UK financialmarkets. RJ said that he would use the UK address ofundisclosed contacts of his to avoid raisingsuspicions because Anthony Stephen Wilkinson hadwritten a similar letter and had his UK postal addressaltered to a South African postal address. The currentpostal address of Fredrick Parker Smith on theTOP-CAAAN share register was Australian and it wouldnot appear irregular that he had relocated residenceseveral times over the years, and was now based in theUK.RJ would arrange for Fredrick Parker Smith’s initialletter to be hand delivered to TOP-CAAAN. Standardprocedure would be for TOP-CAAAN to verify FredrickParker Smith’s signature and content of his letter,with what we had on record, and respond as required bythe shareholder. The major point of reference wasactually the shareholder’s signature, which wouldmatch in this case. TOP-CAAAN would then send FredrickParker Smith the information he had asked for,accompanied by indemnities covering the issuance of adividend draft for a total amount of US $ 25,000. Thiswould be sent to Fredrick Parker Smith’s UK address asindicated on his letter. RJ’s UK contacts would thensend TOP-CAAAN’s response to his South African postaladdress by DHL to enable signature appending andprocessing of forgeries. TOP-CAAAN would then processa draft of US $ 25,000 and send it by registered postto Fredrick Parker Smith’s UK address. RJ’s UKcontacts would again similarly send the draft by DHLto RJ in South Africa. As in Anthony StephenWilkinson’s case, Dave would then arrange for anaccount to be opened for Fredrick Parker Smith atNational Bank of Zimbabwe, Bulawayo, where the draftwould be processed. Forgeries and other criminalprocessing fees would amount to about US $ 7,000according to RJ, which would leave Dave, RJ and myselfwith US $ 6,000 each.In between this, Fredrick Parker Smith would alsowrite another letter saying that he was also not inpossession of his share certificate, which again, wasunderstandable. The issuance of a replacement sharecertificate would go through a similar process,meaning that we would reap criminal gain from thedraft and the sale of the shares, around the sametime. In the meantime, Dave and RJ expected that Iwould be working on identifying other big dormantaccounts worth US $ 1,000,000 to enable us wind up ourcriminal venture in the space of six to nine months.We would thereafter part ways for good. RJ estimatedthat we would be able to obtain Fredrick ParkerSmith’s replacement draft within seven or eight weeks’time, as he would arrange for delivery of FredrickParker Smith’s initial letter to TOP-CAAAN on Monday,27th October 2003. We concluded our meeting on thisdetailed understanding at 7.15 p.m. on Wednesday, 22ndOctober 2003. RJ told me that like Dave, he stayed atthe Harare Sheraton whenever he was in town.I got home at about 7.40 p.m. on Wednesday, 22ndOctober 2003, called Mudzurire and gave him a sevenminute briefing of my meeting with RJ. Mudzurirelistened intently as usual and at the end, told me toprepare a written report the following day and deliverit personally to his office.The next four weeks were quiet regarding the matter ofTOP-CAAAN, Dave and RJ. I heard nothing fromMudzurire, Masatwana, Dave or RJ. This silence washowever broken on Monday afternoon, 24th November 2003by a call from RJ on my cell phone. RJ was in a goodmood and showered praises on me for my exemplary rolein the matter so far. He told me that the executedindemnities for the issuance of a replacement drafthad been delivered to TOP-CAAAN the previous Friday,and we would all get paid around the second week ofJanuary 2004. RJ however told me that this was reasonenough to hold a small celebration following thesuccessful conclusion of the first stage. He told methat Dave would be in town that Thursday, and thethree of us could get together on Friday, 28thNovember 2003 at the Hotel Intercontinental, Harare. Ihad no knowledge of what RJ was talking about, but Inevertheless played along and accepted his invitation.Immediately after getting off the phone with RJ, Icalled Mudzurire to let him know about the latestdevelopment. I also let him know in a firm but politematter, that I was displeased at having been kept inthe dark on the happenings of the past four weeks. Iwould have appeared extremely incompetent to Dave andRJ had they called in between wanting information.Mudzurire asked me to go to his office immediately toenable us discuss the matter. At his office, Icontinued by telling Mudzurire that I should neverhave been allowed to take part in the operation if Iwas suspected of complicity in the matter, and shouldhave been either interdicted or summarily dismissed. Itold Mudzurire that I was most exposed and most atrisk in the matter, and did not appreciate this shoddytreatment at all. Moreover, no consideration tolessening my regular office duties as I gave attentionto the matter of Dave and RJ, had been given. Theexpenses I was incurring in the matter of Dave and RJwere my own and had not been allocated any budget.It’s as if I was working for myself and not TOP-CAAAN,and now this call that morning from RJ.Mudzurire read my fury clearly and asked me to calmdown. He told me that he was glad to hear that I wasdue to meet Dave and RJ this coming Friday and woulduse that opportunity to have Dave and RJ arrested. Iwould then have the chance to air my grievances afterthis. Mudzurire told me he had been shown FredrickParker Smith’s purported submissions that morning thatincluded a passport photocopy that bore RJ’s image.Mudzurire told me that they could use this to move inon RJ, and was more than pleased to hear that both ofthem would be in town on the coming Friday. Mudzuriretold me to keep my composure at this crucial stage. PART IV – CONCLUSION RJ called me on Friday morning, 28th November 2003 toconfirm whether our meeting that evening was still onand I confirmed that it was. He told me that he andDave would be at the Harare Hotel Intercontinental at6.00 p.m. at the first floor balcony, next to theChizarira bar. I then called Mudzurire on his cellphone to notify him of this. I felt relieved that thematter was likely to be concluded that evening, whichwould enable me focus on other things. At 5.45 p.m.that evening, I called Mudzurire, and he told me thathe and a team of officers from ZISU Company 13 werealready stationed at the Harare Intercontinental. Inow knew why Mudzurire was highly regarded for hisdependability.I got to the Intercontinental at 6.05 p.m. andimmediately proceeded to the first floor balcony whereI found both Dave and RJ. They both greeted me withelation calling me Zimbabwe’s newest millionaire. Asusual, RJ ordered three cold beers for the three of usas we engaged in hearty discussion. Dave, who I hadnot seen since 3rd October 2003, jokingly asked mewhether I would buy a mansion in Harare’s eliteStephanie neighbourhood when this was over, or whetherI would take a once in a lifetime luxury cruise aroundthe world. RJ dismissed Dave saying that I wouldalmost certainly go into politics. I said that I wouldnot opt for either of their proposals, and wouldinstead marry four extra wives, and we all broke intoprolonged laughter. Coincidentally, all three of uswere separated from our wives. Dave was the moreexcited of the two, suggesting that we should hop fromjoint to joint getting really plastered and end theevening at ‘Cloud 9’, a famous downtown Hararebrothel. RJ was in agreement and I sat there staringat both of them in bewilderment. Dave asked if I wasoffended by the final part of their suggestion and Ireplied no, but quickly added that both of them shouldhave been born Black, and there was more prolongedlaughter. I had never known that Asians and Whitesalso went to ‘Cloud 9’. On a serious note, Dave toldme we would need to see each other about opening anaccount for me at National Bank of Zimbabwe, Bulawayo,when he and RJ obtained Fredrick Parker Smith’s draftof US $ 25,000. Since NBZ was linked nationwide byVery Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT), I would be ableto make convenient withdrawals and deposits at any oftheir branches, including Harare, once my account wasoperational.In between our second beer, Mudzurire, called me on mycell phone and asked me make out as though I wasspeaking to a client. This was at about 6.40 p.m. Hethen told me to excuse myself and go to the bathroomafter five minutes, where I would find a Company 13officer in a navy blue suit. I would then leave theIntercontinental with the Company 13 officer troughthe back exit and be led to his vehicle. Company 13officers led by Inspector Timothy Turugize, would thenmove in and arrest Dave and RJ. I did exactly whatMudzurire told me and was in his car in the next fewmoments where I witnessed the arrests with him. Thewhole episode took about fifteen minutes and I mustsay I was impressed with the manner Turugize handledit. There were four or five other Company 13 officersstrategically located close by, from what I could see.Mudzurire didn’t however appear to be payingattention, and was instead busy attending to calls onboth his cell phone and the communication radio in hisvehicle. I had never had much regard for ZISU Company13, feeling that it was just a unit of Ndebele andShona officers, created for the dual purpose ofreducing unemployment, and scoring political points.This bias changed that night. No wonder Mudzurirecould afford to attend to other matters as Company 13carried out the arrests. After fifteen minutes, Dave and RJ were led outdiscreetly by Turugize and his officers, and we drovein a convoy of about five vehicles to ChitungwizaPolice Station in central Harare. Mudzurire left me inthe car and went in for about half an hour. I urinatea lot when I drink, and I relieved myself twice in thebushes during that half hour. It brought back teenagememories of how I was once arrested near this veryChitungwiza Police Station for urinating close to it’sfence and ‘desecrating the Republic of Zimbabwe’.While also waiting for Mudzurire, Turugize and atleast two other Company 13 officers came toMudzurire’s vehicle to thank me. I was honored.Mudzurire dropped me at my Tutwane house at 8.00 p.m.that night. He also thanked me.About three weeks after the night of 28th November2003, Deborah received an overseas call from someoneclaiming to be Anthony Stephen Wilkinson, enquiringwhy he had not received two or three dividend drafts.

40 YEARS LATER

HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE IN KENYA UNDER DANIEL ARAP MOI, 1978-2001 Korwa G. Adar and Isaac M Munyae INTRODUCTION Jomo Kenyatta, the founding president of Kenya, passed away in August 1978 after fourteen years as head of state. His successor, Daniel Arap Moi, served as Kenyattas vice-president from 1966 - 1978. During Kenyatta's presidency, the political realm was dominated by a small Kikuyu elite, the so-called Kiambu Mafia, from Kenyata's home district. This group undermined Kenyatta's nationalist and populist background, alienating other ethnic groups, as well as many non-conforming Kikuyus. Although Moi was loyal to Kenyatta, he was never accepted into Kenyatta's inner circle. He also came from a small community--the Kalenjin. He was regarded by Kenyans to be the right candidate to steer the country towards a more accommodating human rights era, without ethnic dominance.This general perception of Moi by Kenyans was reinforced by the decisions and promises he made immediately he took over the presidency. In December 1978 Moi released all twenty-six political detainees across the ethnic spectrum, most of whom had been languishing in jails for years.1 He also reassured Kenyans that his administration would not condone drunkenness, "tribalism", corruption, and smuggling, problems already deeply entrenched in Kenya.2 His administration also took quick actions against top civil servants accused of corruption, culminating in the resignations of officials including the Police Commissioner, Bernard Hinga. These actions were interpreted by Kenyans as an indication of the dawn of a new era, a conducive environment for adherence to democracy and human rights. In due course, however, Moi became more interested in neutralizing those perceived to be against his leadership. The issues of corruption, "tribalism" and human rights per se became distant concerns. Instead, Moi began to centralize and personalize power when he took over the presidency. He pledged to follow Kenyatta's nyayo (Swahili for "footsteps"). He wanted ordinary Kenyans to perceive him as a true nationalist in his own right, and as a close confidant of Kenyatta. He traveled constantly throughout the country addressing many prearranged or ad hoc public gatherings. He popularized nyayo within the context of what he called "love, peace and unity".3 His grand design turned out to be a strategy geared toward the achievement of specific objectives, namely, the control of the state, the consolidation of power, the legitimization of his leadership, and the broadening of his political base and popular support. It turned out this strategy called for little respect of human rights.Initially, Moi's ascendancy to the presidency faced a major handicap because of the dissension against his leadership from within the ranks of the ruling party, Kenya African National Union (KANU). This came from the influential "Kiamba Mafia" that had constituted themselves into what became known as the Change the Constitution Movement.4 The main objective of the movement was to bar Moi from taking over the presidency. The group called for the amendment of the Kenyan constitutional clause which conferred rights on the Vice-President to take over the presidency for ninety days pending the general elections should the office of the president fall vacant.5 The movement failed, mainly due to the opposition it faced from Moi's ally, attorney general Charles Njonjo. Moi succeeded in assuming the presidency and thereafter began to systematically institute an authoritarian and oppressive one-man state rule. Kenyatta's style of restraint and steering the country as a de facto one-party state did not conform to Moi's leadership and behavioral characteristics. Moi's style -- the centralization and personalization of power -- gradually laid the foundation for a dictatorship and innumerable human rights violations by his administration. When Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and George Anyona sought to register a socialist opposition party in 1982, Moi struck back by making the country a de jure one party state. He criminalized competitive politics and criticism of his leadership.6 Throughout the 1980s to 1990s the security forces, particularly the police, were used to suppress any criticism of his regime.To ensure his grip on power, Moi systematically usurped the functions of the other institutions of governance to the extent that the principle of the separation of powers was rendered ineffectual. A few days after releasing all the political detainees, he rushed a bill through Kenya's parliament which granted the president emergency powers for the first time in Kenya's post-independence history. Moi associated insecurity and instability with open criticisms and challenge to his policies and style of leadership. Patronage and loyalty therefore has remained characteristic of Moi's leadership style which has enabled him to centralize and personalize his rule.7 For more than two decades as Kenya's head of state, the second longest serving president in Sub-Saharan Africa -- Moi has remained what has been described as a "tribal paramount chief writ large".8 In return for patronage, he enjoys praise from civil servants and KANU officials to an embarrassing degree. For example, in one of the numerous public functions he attended, a senior minister stated while pointing at him: "There, is enshrined in human form the popular will ... Even lobsters and fishes of the sea, out to the 200- mile limit and even beyond, pay obeisance to our great president the Honorable Daniel Arap Moi."9This article deals with the manner in which the autocratic patronage system established by Moi has undermined the rule of law and respect for human rights in Kenya. It is an authoritarian system in which the president delegates no responsibilities and becomes personally involved in almost everything in the country, particularly issues concerning the rights of individual Kenya citizens to speak their minds, assemble without hindrance, write and publish without being molested. . THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION, CENTRALIZATION AND PERSONALIZATION OF THE PRESIDENCY The trend began with presidential directives and constitutional amendments. Apart from the Constitution of Kenya, Amendment Act, Number 7 of 1982, which introduced Section 2(A) transforming the country into a de jure one-party state, Kenya's parliament, on Moi's order, reinstated the detention laws which had been suspended in 1978. Colonial era laws, like the Chief's Authority Act, the Public Order Act, the Preservation of Public Security Act, the Public Order Act, and the Penal Codes, gave the president the right to suspend individual rights guaranteed by the constitution.10 The parliamentary privilege, which gave representatives the right to obtain information from the Office of the President, was also revoked. This meant that members of parliament, and by extension their constituents, surrendered their constitutional rights to the presidency. Parliamentary supremacy became subordinated to the presidency and the ruling KANU party.11For the first time in Kenya's post independence history, the provincial administrators (Provincial Commissioners[PCs], the District Commissioners[DCs], and District Officers [DOs]) who are civil servants, were directed by the Office of the President to get involved in the internal affairs of KANU. They were to review and clear party meetings throughout the country and to isolate dissenters. KANU officials and members of parliament henceforth were subjected to these administrative procedures, undermining the meaning and legitimacy of representation in Kenya's legislature. These reorganizations and restructurings had a number of implications. First, the structures of representation both within KANU and parliament were obscured. The provincial administration now had the power to prevent an elected member of parliament from addressing his or her own constituents. Second, patronage and loyalty to the President became mandatory for one's political survival. In the 1988 general elections most members of parliament were not elected but selected by the party.12 One of the first victims to fail the loyalty test was the man behind Moi's smooth ascendancy to the Presidency, Charles Njonjo, then attorney general and minister for constitutional affairs, who was accused of plotting to overthrow Moi's government.13 Third, those perceived to be against the President and KANU policies were denied the right to contest electoral seats.By 1981 all the ethnic-centered welfare associations had been banned. These included the Luo Union, the Gikuyu, Embu, and Meru Association (GEMA), and the Abaluhya Union. The president also outlawed the Civil Servants Union (CSU) and the Nairobi University Academic Staff Union (UASU). In 1986 Moi gave a directive for the Maendeleo Ya Wanawake Organization (MYWO), a national non-governmental organization for women, to be affiliated to KANU, and in 1987 officially changed its name to KANU-MYWO.14 The Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU), the umbrella body for most of the trade unions in Kenya, had been an ally of KANU for more than two decades, with most of its top leadership frequently selected by KANU, particularly in the 1980s to 1990s. These changes strengthened party-state relations and solidified presidential control of the state. Between 1964 to 1990, twenty-four constitutional amendments were enacted by parliament, all intended to strengthen the presidency at the expense of civil rights. On the 1st of August 1982 there was a military coup attempt by some junior Kenya Air Force officers. It was put down at an estimated 600 to 1,800 lives. This accelerated the process of the control of the state and solidified Moi's authoritarian rule.15 In 1986 parliament enacted Act No. 14 followed in 1988 by Act No.4, imposing limitations on the independence of the judiciary, with far reaching human rights violations. Sections 61(1) and (2) of the Constitution empower the president to appoint the chief justice and puisne judges respectively upon the recommendations of the Judicial Services Commission (JSC) which is also appointed by the president. The 1986 and 1988 constitutional amendments provided for the removal of the security and tenure of the Attorney General, the Controller and Auditor General, the judges of the High Court and the Court of Appeal. Parliament, which at this time was under the control of the executive arm of the government, did not resist these amendments. The control of parliament and the judiciary meant that the office of the president was in a position to manipulate the functions of the two branches of the government. Both Parliament and the Judiciary ceased to have the constitutional rights to control the excesses of the executive. There were no checks and balances on Moi's personal authority. Two major events happened before Act 14 of 1986 was passed in Parliament to symbolize the unchecked power of the executive. In his ruling in a case in which an American marine had murdered a Kenyan woman in Mombassa, a judge found the accused guilty but fined the marine only Kenyan shillings 500 (about $50) and bonded him for one year probation.16 The issue was raised in parliament thereafter because of the light sentence imposed by the judge. The then Attorney General, James B. Karugu, as the chief legal advisor to the government, responded by criticizing the decision of the judge. He did not last long in his position. After that, the Controller and Auditor General questioned why a state owned corporation engaged the services of a private lawyer in this particular case.17 His office became the object of executive branch criticism. Moi interpreted both of these actions as direct threats to his leadership and thus pressured parliament to enact the amendments to give him more authority over the judiciary and the audit department. The police had, through Act 14 of 1988, the prerogative to detain the critiques of the regime for fourteen days while coercing them into submission. By this time parliament was functioning largely as a rubber stamp of policies initiated by the presidency. President Moi's control of parliament thereafter was extended to elections. The "Queue" voting system introduced by KANU in 1986 replaced the secret ballot with a system where voters lined up behind candidates. Those parliamentary candidates who secured more than 70 percent of the votes did not have to go through the process of the secret ballot in the general elections. This system encouraged electoral rigging and paved the way for what has been described elsewhere as "selection within an election". In a situation where there was a dispute over head-count, a repeat of the same process was not possible at the end of the exercise.18 The provincial administrators, who were the election officers, were only answerable to the presidency and they declared as winners only those candidates favored by the regime. Disputes arising out of nominations were often refereed to the president personally as the final arbiter over matters pertaining to the only political party in the country. Kenyans thus lost their right to vote for parliamentary candidates of their choice. The judicial system could not protect human rights either. The British judges who have continued to serve Kenya as part of the British overseas development aid are more susceptible to the manipulation than their Kenyan counterparts because they are seconded on contracts.19 Under the terms of the agreement between Kenya and the United Kingdom, the renewal of contracts were at the discretion of the Kenya government.20 A former British expatriate judge in Kenya, Eugene Cotran, openly stated that in cases in which the president has direct interest, the government applied pressure on the expatriate judges to make rulings in favor of the state.21 It was as a result of similar circumstances, that two expatriate judges, Justices Derek Schofield and Patrick O'Connor, resigned because of what they called a judicial system "blatantly contravened by those who are supposed to be its supreme guardians".22Interference with the judicial process in the late 1990s, with respect to "political" cases, rose to a new high. At a workshop held at Mbagathi (Nairobi) in April 1995, Judges Bena Lata and William Mbuya accused the government of interfering in cases that were then in court.23 The attempts by the Law Society of Kenya (LSK) to achieve the repeal of the restrictions and to handle legal cases in the courts of law without interference and intimidation landed some of the outspoken lawyers in detention in the 1980s. In 1990, the Office of the President succeeded in manipulating the LSK elections which saw its sponsored candidate, Fred Ojiambo, defeating the pro-multiparty supporter, Paul Muite, for the chairmanship.24 This move was designed to control the legal profession by the state. To bolster his grip on power, Moi also embarked on the gradual Kalenjinization of the public and private sectors from the 1980s. Moi is a Tugen, one of the smaller Kalenjin ethnic groups. He began to "de-Kikuyunize" the civil service and the state-owned enterprises previously dominated by the Kikuyu ethnic group during Kenyatta's regime. He appointed Kalenjins in key posts in, among others, Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC), Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB), Kenya Posts and Telecommunications (KPT), Central Bank of Kenya (CBK), Kenya Industrial Estates (KIE), National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB), and the Kenya Grain Growers Cooperative Union (KGGCU). He created Nyayo Tea Zones (NTZ), Nyayo Bus Company (NBC) and Nyayo Tea Zones Development Corporation (NTZDC).25The only remaining major worry for the presidency by 1990 was the church, particularly the Anglican Church (then known as the Church of Province of Kenya), the Catholic Church and the Presbyterian Church of East Africa, which together account for over 70% of the Kenyan Christian community, a majority of the population. Together with the umbrella organization, the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), the church has persistently and consistently used the pulpit to criticize Moi's authoritarian regime.26 What Moi has established over the years is a clear manifestation of an institutionalized authoritarian regime with a habit of human rights violations. It was not until the return of multiparty politics in Kenya, after demonstrations in 1990, that the situation changed. ASSASSINATION, REPRESSION AND DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL OF DISSIDENTS When the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), of which Moi was the chairman, crossed the floor and joined KANU in 1964, Moi was appointed by Kenyatta as the minister for home affairs. He became the Vice-President in 1967, but kept the home affairs portfolio. The Kenyan police force, which at the time of independence out numbered the national defense forces, was under his jurisdiction as the minister for home affairs. Kenya Police includes the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), the paramilitary General Service Unit (GSU), and the Directorate of Security and Intelligence (DSI). Moi therefore was exposed to the structure and functions of the police force for fourteen years before he became president. Under Kenyatta's instructions, Vice-President Moi invoked his administrative prerogatives to detain Oginga Odinga and the other eight leaders of the then opposition Kenya People's Union (KPU) in 1969 when that party was proscribed by Kenyatta. Moi explained that the KPU leaders were detained because "any government worth its salt must put the preservation of public security above the convenience of a handful of persons who are doing their utmost to undermine it".27 As the person in charge of internal security for fourteen years, he established a network of supporters within the ranks of the intelligence community. It was one of his counter-intelligence supporters, James Kanyotu, who telephoned him when Kenyatta died in 1978.28Detentions and political trials, torture, arbitrary arrests and police brutality reminiscent of the colonial era have become common during Moi's tenure. He perceives human rights generally as alien and Euro centric conceptions inconsistent with African values and culture. He views the pro-democracy and human rights advocates in Kenya as unpatriotic, disloyal, and ungrateful individuals influenced by what he calls foreign masters.29 A few years after taking over the presidency, Moi began to exercise his style of authoritarianism by detaining a number of Kenyans critical of his government. Table One indicates the extent to which detention has been consistently used as an instrument for suppressing Moi's outspoken opponents in the 1980s and 1990s. Some of these detainees were former or sitting MPs arrested for demanding, among other things, the introduction of multiparty politics.After the university staff union was banned, University of Nairobi faculty members, Willy Mutunga and Katama Mukangi, were detained for what Moi called "over-indulgence in politics".30 This was just the beginning of the crackdown on Kenyans by his Administration in the 1980s. Apart from detaining the UASU leaders, the passports of lecturers considered to be critical of his rule were seized.31Moi's actions were meant to silence the intelligent, perceived to be critical of his authoritarian rule. The emergence of the little known clandestine London based movement, Mwakenya, set the stage for more widespread human rights violations by his Administration. In 1986 alone, 100 people were arrested and detained for their alleged association with Mwakenya, the movement started by some Kenyans in Europe who had fled Moi's oppression, demanded, inter alia, social justice and respect for human rights.32 Even though Moi made a big issue out of the movement, there was no tangible evidence of a well organized group in the country that threatened Kenya's national security and which would have warranted the massive arbitrary arrest, torture, and detention without trial of the suspects. Moi used the same tactic when he denounced the February Eighteenth Movement (FEM) which he accused of planning attacks on Kenya to be launched from Uganda in the early 1990s.33 Between 1989 to 1991 Kenya saw one of the worst human rights violations in its history. Moi accused advocates of multiparty politics of subversion, and thereby got a fresh excuse for detaining a new generation of his critics. A number of the champions of multiparty politics--John Khaminwa, Raila Odinga, Mohammed Ibrahim, Gitobu Imanyara, Kenneth Matiba and Charles Rubia--among others, were detained under inhuman conditions and without trial. Human rights lawyers, Gibson Kamau Kuria and Kiraitu Murungi, fled to the United States to avoid being jailed. Arrests and detentions in fact followed every one of Moi's warning against his critics. As has been the practice throughout his leadership, the police moved quickly and arrested those in the forefront for democracy, with the judiciary merely sanctioning what is commonly known in Kenya as political cases.34 A case becomes political when Moi makes a direct statement regarding the case in question even when it has subjudice implications.35 The ruling against the Universities Academic Staff Union (UASU) and its officials between 1993 to 1995 serve as good examples of the level of state interference in political cases.36 The union which sought to promote academic freedom and professionalism in Kenya universities was defended by seven well known human rights lawyers: Pheroze Nowrojee, James Orengo, Gibson Kamau Kuria, Paul Muite, Kiraitu Murungi, Otieno Kajwang' and Kathurima M'Inoti, among others. The courts refused outright to hear it while the police harassed its officials. Suppression of freedom of the press, assembly, association, expression and movement and other fundamental rights of individuals were extended to the press, and non-governmental organizations. In 1991 Moi banned the production of George Orwell's Animal Farm. He also banned Ngugi Wa Thiong's play Ngaahika Ndeenda (Kikuyu for, "I Will Marry When I Want") considered by the regime to be subversive because it attacks post-independence African dictators.37By this time detention and the violation of human rights were regularly protested by civil society, with the church and the LSK taking the lead. Since the 1980s the church had remained the central locus of dissent against the Moi regime, with the pro-democracy and human rights movements using cathedrals and the compounds of churches as venues for expressing their views and drawing plans for action. But using the church as a refuge did not deter the regime from arresting, assaulting and detaining its critiques within church compounds. In one of his sermons, the late Anglican Bishop Alexander K. Muge emphasized that the church has a moral obligation to "protest when God-given rights and liberties are violated" and to " give voice to the voiceless".38 Even though some politicians and the Office of the President condemned his criticism of the queue voting system, Bishop Muge maintained that: "I shall not protest against violations of human rights in South Africa if I am not allowed to protest the violation of human rights in my own country".39 Yet not even the clergy was spared arrest by the police. The Presbyterian minister Rev. Timothy Njoya was arrested in 1988 for suggesting that Kenyans should hold discussions on critical questions affecting the country. Bishop Muge's death in a car crash in August 1990 is still shrouded in mystery. As demands for competitive elections and an end to detention without trial continued, Kenya's Foreign Affairs Minister, Dr. Robert Ouko, was assassinated in February 1990. Demands to reveal his real murders amplified those for pluralism and respect for human rights. To save his regime from collapse, Moi adopted even greater authoritarian tactics arguing on a number of occasions that multipartism would cause chaos in the country because Kenya was not "cohesive enough". Clergymen, lawyers, and other pro-democracy and human rights advocates were persistently arrested and harassed. The crackdown intensified during the Saba Saba (July 7) 1990 meeting, organized by the pro-democracy and human rights advocates. Some of these leaders later founded the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD). The forum advocated an end to jailing dissenters without trial. The attempt by the American embassy to broker a negotiated permission for FORD to hold its first public meeting scheduled for 16 November, 1991 failed. The government refused to issue a permit and instead arrested Oginga Odinga and Gitobu Imanyara. Masinde Muliro, Martin Shikuku, James Orengo, and Paul Muite managed to go into hiding. The FORD leaders, however, later went ahead with the meeting, but were arrested by the police who forcefully dispersed the gathering. Instead of ending detention, the government arrested leaders who then were charged under section 5(10)(d) of the Public Security Act. The Act states that "any person who prints, publishes, displays, distributes or circulates notice of, or in any other manner advertises or publicizes, a public meeting or public procession which has not been licensed under this section, shall be guilty of an offense".40 The US Congress, concerned with human rights violations and corruption, passed the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1991 requiring Kenya to meet certain conditions before $15 million in economic and military aid could be disbursed.41 These conditions were based on the provisions that Kenya "charge and try or release all prisoners, including any persons detained for political reasons; cease any physical abuse or mistreatment of prisoners; restore the independence of the judiciary; and restore freedoms of expression."42 US Congressional concerns for human rights violations in Kenya gained momentum in the 1990s, culminating in a fact finding mission to Kenya by high ranking Senators and the release of Kenneth Matiba, Charles Rubia, Raila Odinga, and Gitobu Imanyara.At this point the KANU government tactically gave in. It agreed to repeal Section 2A of the Constitution which made Kenya a de jure one-party state. This decision paved the way for the formation of political parties, namely FORD (Forum for Restoration of Democracy) led by the opposition veteran, Oginga Odinga, and the Democratic Party of Kenya (DP) under Mwai Kibaki. There were other smaller parties. By splitting their votes against Moi's KANU, the opposition assured KANU a victory, albeit one characterized by violent repression and unfairness at the polls. Violations of human rights continued even under the conditions of a symbolic multi-party democracy. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS UNDER MULTI-PARTY RULE When Kenya entered the second multi-party era it was assumed that by allowing opposition to exist, the government would create an enabling environment for its citizens to freely exercise their constitutionally guaranteed rights. What resulted, however, was continuity in human rights violations by the police, and government-supported armed militia and hired thugs. The arbitrary arrests, detentions, and the practice of the interference of the judiciary by the executive, also continued for most of the 1990s. In the early 1990s, the KANU government went as far as instigating ethnic violence in order to portray the multi-party system as inappropriate for Kenya. Ethnic cleansing was introduced in order to eliminate opposition in "KANU-only zones." From various independent human rights reports, the 1992 and 1998 ethnic violence in the Rift Valley Province was deliberately inflamed for political purposes by members of the government. Violence spread in the Likoni-Kwale (Coast Province) prior to and after the 1997 general elections, in areas where opposition to KANU was strong. The 1998 clashes were different from the previous ones in that this time the Kikuyu community in the Rift Valley retaliated in an organized fashion which the attackers had not anticipated. Independent investigators again confirmed state complicity in these 1997 violations of human rights. A task force appointed by KANU as well as a parliamentary committee reaffirmed the findings of the National Christian Council of Kenya (NCCK) that the state was involved in widespread ethnic cleansing in the Rift Valley.43 As ethnic conflict and other forms of human rights violations intensified in the early 1990s, the church issued statements protesting the government's inaction in maintaining order and in stopping human rights violations. In one of their pastoral letters addressed to Moi, the Roman Catholic Church wrote: "Although our pleas, requests and advice ... seem to have been ignored by you, we on our side will not abandon our responsibilities. We have seen and heard of so much wickedness perpetrated in Kenya since the clashes began. Innocent people, peaceful and humble, and even churches and mosques have been attacked and destroyed. All these abominations are done in your name, by some of your Cabinet Ministers, your DCs, DOs, your GSU and your police."44 The use of militia to instigate violence on behalf of KANU and the government began with the 1991-1993 ethnic clashes. To attack opposition groups, "Kalenjin warriors" donned traditional attire and used arrows from South Korea transported by helicopters.45 Political violence also occurred in 1997 and 1998 in the Rift Valley Province, particularly in Trans Nzoia and Nakuru Districts. As in the 1992 ethnic clashes, the conflict was between pro-KANU supporters and ethnic communities that were deemed sympathetic to the opposition. According to human rights groups, the fact that the Provincial Administrators, the GSU, and the police were involved in the conflicts again implicated the state. An investigative report into the Likoni-Kwale violence of August 1997, produced by the Kenya Human Rights Commission, for instance, established that the causes of the violence were essentially the politicization of the socioeconomic situation in the region by local politicians.46 The report implied involvement of the government in that Mombassa KANU politicians, Rashid Sajad and Karisa Maitha, had paid a visit to an armed militia training camp in Shimba Hills. They reassured young men recruited from Uganda, Rwanda (mainly Hutus), and Ukunda (Coast Province) that the government was not only behind but also supported the expulsion of "up-country" people from the area.47 Apart from the assumption based on evidence that the clashes were not being perpetrated by indigenous people, there are also other instances that indicate that the government was either not concerned about the human rights violations against opposition inclined ethnic groups or it was behind the attacks. On January 27, 1998, a group of Catholic priests and nuns, international journalists, and a unit of about thirty-eight policemen witnessed a Kalenjin raid on a Kikuyu homestead near the junction of Njoro and Molo in the Rift Valley Province. The police did not act until the nuns ran after the raiders.48As noted above, one of the main objectives of the regime in instigating ethnic cleansing was to "prove" to Kenyans and the world that multiparty politics was not suitable for a multi-ethnic country like Kenya. Moi wanted to demonstrate that he is not willing to relinquish power and control of the state. Indeed, he is fearful of the potential consequences if he were to loose power because of the misdeeds and corrupt practices associated with his regime. Despite a multiparty election, detention, arbitrary arrests and torture of ordinary people -- particularly the pro-democracy and human rights advocates and the opposition members of parliament -- continued although at a declining rate throughout the 1990s. The continued arrests of members of parliament in particular undermined the right of representation. Members of parliament have been arrested for addressing "illegal" meetings even in cases where such meetings are licensed by the government.49In a report on Kenya submitted to the United Nations in 1993, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) stated that although Kenya has been a party to the Convention since 3 January 1976, it had not submitted a single report as stipulated under Articles 16 and 17 of the covenant. The committee also observed that there is no institutional mechanism in Kenya responsible for the enforcement of human rights, with the High Court performing no constitutional role in this regard.50 The state continued to interfere with court evidence as was shown in the case of Koigi wa Wamwere who had been charged with subversion in 1994. His defense attorneys discovered that the Magistrate, William Tuiyot, had interfered with the proceedings.51Despite the pressure mounted by internal pro-democracy and human rights groups, another type of repression came into the scene after the 1992 elections: informal repression by the state. This involved the use of proxy agencies and groups to attack the pro-democracy and human rights supporters. Although not new to Kenya, this became an important political tool under Moi in the multiparty era.52 During the December 1992 elections, and again in 1997, the KANU government used its control over the instruments of coercion and the Electoral Commission to place an undue advantage over the opposition. Private militia and groups of thugs were used to disrupt opposition rallies. At the same time, KANU adopted a number of strategies that undermined free and fair elections in 1992 and 1997. Among them was lopsided voter registration which excluded opposition voters, an Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) that was biased, intimidation of journalists, and banning of print media that is critical of the regime. The Provincial Administration in both elections helped KANU undermine the opposition party's prospects from gaining ground in the elections. The commissioners of the ECK were appointed by the President alone despite protest by the opposition. It the ignored protests of nearly four million eligible voters, (particularly the youth who had attained the age of eighteen years) who were denied registration in 1992. Voting in 1992 and 1997 was characterized by the suppression of voters' rights by the government in 1997. It was reported that in the Likoni polling stations in the Coast Province, "up-country" people could not vote because their names did not appear on the register, even though they had viable voter registration cards. In one incident, an "up-country" lawyer working in Mombassa insisted on checking the register and actually found his name.53 The ECK was taking advantage of people's ignorance to ensure a KANU victory at the coast and elsewhere. Journalists were ill-treated and attacked by police for reporting these incidents. In February 1997, for instance, Susan Mosoke, a photographer, was assaulted by an administration policeman when covering a story on the deliberate delay in the issuance of identity cards so that people would not be able to register for voting.54In the build-up to the 1997 elections, opposition demonstrations in favor of constitutional reforms to ensure free and fair elections were met with police beatings. Under external donor pressure, some amendments were made and enacted in November 1997, however, the police continued to contravene the constitution by violating the rights enshrined in the constitution. The reform champions demanded repeal of the Preservation of Public Security Act, sections of the Penal Code dealing with sedition and treason, the Public Order Act, the Chiefs Authority Act, the Administration Police Act and the Societies Act.55 These were laws used to lock up and detain human rights campaigners and pro-democracy activists. These reforms were actively supported by church groups, opposition parties, human rights organizations, and other NGOs under the forum of the National Convention Assembly (NCA). They challenged the impartiality of the Electoral Commission, decried restrictions on opposition parties, and demanded unhindered access to the broadcast media and a fair registration process.56 These reforms were the result of negotiations by an inter-party forum known as the Inter- Parties Parliamentary Group (IPPG). It made recommendations to Parliament and some laws were indeed changed.57 The Public Order Act gave way to a measure of freedom of assembly as long as police were notified by organizers of public gatherings. The police could now prevent the holding of a meeting if notice of another meeting had been received and there was a conflict. However, the police are still authorized to stop or prevent the holding of a meeting if no notice has been given, or if another meeting in the same venue presents "clear or imminent dangers of the breach of peace or the public order."58 The police subsequently used this clause to stop meetings deemed as likely to undermine the ruling party's authority. The authority of the chief to regulate the movement of persons from the jurisdiction of one chief to another--another act violating the right of free movement--was repealed in the amendments to the Chiefs' Act. However, the local administration still practices the power of arrest and detention. In May 1998, a meeting by KANU and opposition MPs at Kwanza (Rift Valley Province) was declared illegal. The police beat politicians, journalists, and the general public to prevent the rally.59 A subsequent opposition public meeting was invaded by thirty armed raiders. The police reportedly did nothing to stop the raiders. On January 16, 1999, during vote counting of a by-election in Eastern Province, police used wooden clubs and batons to disperse a crowd outside the vote counting hall. They were protesting the announcement of a narrow victory by the KANU candidate based on the counting of the contested ballot boxes.60 The police entered the hall and beat up opposition MPs. On June 10, 1999, police resorted to tear gas and force to break up a public rally by KANU and opposition MPs at Machakos, Eastern Province, who had met to discuss issues of concern to the Kamba people.61 On February 26, 1999, police used tear gas and police dogs to stop MPs and farmers from holding a public rally at Eldoret, Rift Valley Province. In this context, police brutality was directed towards leaders who wanted to discuss the problems their constituents were facing; the government perceived this as criticism.Despite the presence of a vocal opposition in parliament since 1992, the judiciary has contributed to the consistency and continuity of the human rights violations. Victims of human rights violations are thus left without judicial protection, the High Court having decided that it has no jurisdiction to enforce the human rights provisions of Chapter V of the Constitution, even though section 84 of the Constitution provides for redress before the High Court for violation of any of its provisions.62 Undue interference with the judiciary by the executive branch in matters of appointment continued with the presidency playing a major role.Judges who made rulings in favor of human rights victims exposed themselves to punitive transfers. In September 1994, a chief magistrate was transferred to Kitui, Eastern Province (130 km. from Nairobi) after he refused to accept as evidence the confession of six men accused of raiding the Ndeiya Chief's Camp near Nairobi. The appointment of Bernard Chunga (formerly the chief state Prosecutor) as Chief Justice by Moi in September 1999, was widely criticized by the human rights lawyers as an attempt to further reduce the independence of the judiciary. Chunga was seen as personally loyal to the President.63 In July 1999 the High Court dismissed a petition case filed by Mwai Kibaki, the leader of the Democratic Party, against Moi for rigging the 1997 presidential elections through the Electoral Commission. The case was dismissed on a technicality that Kibaki failed to submit a copy of the petition to Moi personally.64 The truth was that Democratic Party lawyers had been denied personal access to Moi's office by his security guards. The existence of a strong opposition did not help the justice system. In 1999 Moi stated that courts should not interfere in land matters, affairs of public universities, or issues relating to political parties.65 This can help to explain the reason why the courts have handled the political cases in the manner they did. In March 1997, the Chairman of the Kenya Judges and Magistrates Association (KJMA), stated that: "these pronouncements clearly threaten the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, and the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers."66The war-mongers in the ruling party were again protected by the ruling party as they urged violence against the opposition supporters during and after the 1997 elections. At a KANU rally in Narok, some pro-Moi members of parliament threatened DP supporters with reprisals after Kibaki announced his rejection of the election results. A Minister in the Office of the President, Simon Kiptum Arap Choge, warned that there would be bloodshed country-wide if Kibaki's petition threatened Moi's regime, but no action was taken by the police for incitement to violence.67One cannot overlook the fact that members of the opposition also contributed to incitement of violence through issuing public statements. For instance, Mwai Kibaki is quoted as having said that "Mr. Moi cannot afford to maintain silence as if nothing is happening ...[when] the killing of our citizens has been going on in the last two weeks. It is only natural that the victims will take arms to defend themselves."68 This sentiment arose out of the government's lack of action in curbing the ethnic violence. While opposition leaders, such as Stephen Ndicho, were being arrested and charged with inciting violence, nothing was done to KANU and KANU leaders. In 1997 Minister Francis Lotodo asked all non-Kalenjins to leave the Rift Valley, again contradicting the provisions of freedom of movement in the constitution. In September 1999 President Moi himself stated that government officials should deny "permits" to politicians who use public rallies to abuse other leaders. However, officials now have legal rights to cancel such rallies only if they are a threat to security or if there is another meeting in the same venue.69 The KANU government continued to use force to oppress the opposition in the late 1990s, even after the incorporation of the IPPG amendments to the Constitution. Peaceful rallies calling for political and constitutional reforms were persistently violently broken up by the security forces. On June 10, 1999, the police, complemented by a squad of "KANU youth" and the infamous jeshi la mzee (which in Swahili literally means, old man's militia), violently disrupted a peaceful rally organized by religious and civil society groups to protest the government's handling of the constitutional review process. A number of people, including the Reverend Timothy Njoya who has been vocal in criticizing the government, were seriously injured.70 The jeshi la mzee, allegedly sponsored by the Assistant Minister in the Office of the President, Fred Gumo, again appeared on the scene in May 1997 and was used to violently disrupt pro-reform rallies.71 Notwithstanding the elections, government was complicit to violence against its citizens who were exercising their rights of association and expression. CONCLUSIONThe move to strengthen human rights in Kenya has run against the authoritarian rule of Daniel Arap Moi, and his patronage system. Reforms since the introduction of multipartism have created a stalemate between Moi's government and most of the opposition members of parliament, church leaders, and other pro-democracy and human rights advocates. Despite the reinstatement of multiparty elections and attempts to annul laws that permit abuse of human rights, government security agents and armed militia continue to violate civil and individual liberties. The main explanatory factor of why so little has changed is Moi's pattern of rule and his political beliefs. Moi's centralization and personalization of power has led to the subordination of the functions of the judiciary and of parliament. As was the case during the de jure one-party state rule, human rights violations by his administration have continued even after the post-1992 and 1997 multiparty elections. Moi has persistently demonstrated unwillingness to uphold the sanctity of human rights at home. His administration has shown ambivalence in dealing with violence which has persisted in the country, particularly in the Rift Valley and the Coast Provinces. It has been argued in this paper that were it not for the partial success of the IPPG in allowing President Moi and KANU to maintain control, the government would have used the Likoni-Kwale violence as an excuse to declare a state of emergency and thus postpone the elections indefinitely. Despite constitutional reform, the government has been unable to fulfill its obligation to the country's citizens as enshrined in the constitution and international human rights treaties that it is party to. In and of themselves, the elections of 1992 and 1997 proved insufficient to guarantee human rights. It is clear that an independent judiciary and an accountable police force are required if human rights and civil liberties are to be secured for the majority of Kenya's peoples. REFERENCES 1.See, Leonard, David, African Successes: Four Public Managers of Kenyan Rural Development .1991, Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 169. 2. Haugerud, Angelique, The Culture of Politics in Modern Kenya.1995, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 82. 3. See, Moi, Daniel T. Arap, Kenya African Nationalism: Nyayo Philosophy and Principles . 1986, London: Macmillan. See also, Godia, George, Understanding Nyayo: Principles and Policies in Contemporary Kenya . 1984, Nairobi: Transafrica. 4.Ochieng, William R. " Structural and Political Changes", pp. 83-109, in Decolonization and Independence in Kenya, 1940-93 , B. A. Ogot and W. R. Ochieng, Editors. 1995, Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, pp. 83-109. 5. Kenya, The Constitution of Kenya. Laws of Kenya, rev. ed. 1998, Nairobi: Government Printer, Chapter II, PartI (6)(1-2). 6 . Amnesty International, Kenya, Torture, Political Detention and Unfair Trials. AI Index AFR 32/17/87, 1987 and Amnesty International, Kenya: Torture Compounded by the Denial of Medical Care. AI Index AFR 32/18/95, 1995. 7. Widner, J. 1994. "Two Leadership styles and Patterns of Political Liberalization". African Studies Review, 37(1)(April):151-174. 8. Hempstone, Rogue Ambassador, op. cit., pp. 39 and 43. 9. Ibid., p. 290. 10. See, Kimondo, G. K. "The Bill of Rights", in The Citizen and the Constitution. K. Kibwana, G. K. Kimondo and J. T. Gathii, Editors. 1996, Nairobi: Claripress, pp. 54-56. 11. Weekly Review, Nairobi, 8 May 1987. See also, Ogot, B. A., "Politics of Populism", pp. 187-213, in Ogot and Ochieng, op. cit., 187-213. 12. See Adar, K. G. "Ethnicity and Ethnic Kings: The Enduring Dual Constraint in Kenya's Multiethnic Democratic Electoral Experiment". Journal of the Third World Spectrum, 5 (2)( Fall 1998): 71-96. 13. See, Kenya, Report of Judicial Commission Appointed to Inquire into Allegations Involving Charles Mugane Njonjo. Nairobi: Government Printer, November 1984. 14. KANU Maendeleo Ya Wanawake Organization, KANU Maendeleo Ya Wanawake Organization, Information Booklet. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1990, p. 6. 15. Andreassen, B., "Kenya", in Human Rights in Developing Countries Yearbook 1993. B. Andreassen and T. Swanehart, Editors. 1993, Copenhagen: Nordic Human Rights Publications, p. 193. 16. Maina, W., "Constitutional Crisis in Kenya: An Inquiry into the Origins, Nature and Prospects of Reform", Paper Precedented to the IPAR Project on Constitution- Making in Kenya, November/ December 1996, p. 67. 17. Ibid. 18. See generally, Adar, K. G., "The Interface Between Elections and Democracy: Kenya's Search for a Sustainable Democratic System, 1960s - 1990s", pp. 340-360, in African Democracy in the Era of Globalization, J. Hyslop, Editors. 1999. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1999. 19. Africa Watch, Kenya: Taking Liberties. Washington D.C.: An African Watch Report, p. 151. July 1991. "Hannan Lucy, Bias and Judicial Outrage". New Law Journal (London) 141(1991): 900-901 and "Constitutional Law According to Mr. Justice Dugdale" Nairobi Law Monthly, 34 (19910: 15-16). 20. Ibid., 148. 21. Ibid., pp. 151-152. 22. Ibid., P. 153 and generally Omaar, Rakiya, "Ten Years of President Arap Moi in Kenya". Human Rights Watch. New York: Human Rights Watch, October-November 1988. 23. Carver Richard. Writenet Country Report, Kenya Update to End of July 1995, (Writenet Country Papers, August 1995). 24. Widner, The Rise of a Party-State in Kenya, op. cit., pp. 189-190. 25. Ibid., p. 100.26. See Sabar-Friedman, G., "Church and State in Kenya, 1986-1992: The Churches' Involvement in the "Game of Change", African Affairs, 96(1997) : 25-52. See also, Throup, D., "Render unto Caesar the Things That Are Caesar's: The Politics of Church-State Conflict in Kenya, 1978-1990", pp. 154-169, in Religion and Politics in East Africa B. Hansen and M. Twaddle, Editors. 1995, London: James Currey. 27. See, Current Biography. New York: H. W. Wilson Co., p. 262, 1979. 28. Hempstone, Rogue Ambassador, op. cit., p. 35. 29. See, Adar, K. G., "Human Rights and Academic Freedom in Kenya's Public Universities: The Case of The Universities Academic Staff Union". Human Rights Quarterly. 21(1) (February 1999): 187. 30. Ibid., p. 187. 31. Ogot, "Politics of Populism", op. cit., p. 199. 32. See Umoja, Straggle for Democracy in Kenya: Special Report on the 1988 General Elections in Kenya. London: Umoja secretariat, p. 96, 1988 and Widner, The Rise of a Party-State in Kenya, pp. 177-8. no footnote 33 34. Mutua, Makau wa., A long Road to Uhuru: Human Rights and Political Participation in Kenya. Montreal: International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic development, March 1993. 35. Kuria, G. K., "Freedom of Expression and Contempt of Court." Paper Presented at the Second International Commission of Jurists (Kenya Section) Workshop on Administration of Justice in Kenya Courts as Guardians of Justice, 30 March, 1995 and Makali, D., "Court of Appeal Ruling on Don Reeked of State Interference" People (Nairobi, 1994.) 36. See, Adar, K. G., "Human Rights and Academic Freedom", op. cit. 37. Ross, S, "The Rule of Law and Lawyers in Kenya". Journal of Modern African Studies, 30(3)(1992): 428 and Mulei, C., "Banning of Plays not Justifiable Legally" Sunday Standard (Nairobi), 17 March 1991. 38. Sabar-Friedman, "Church and State in Kenya, 1986-1992", op. cit., p. 32. 39. Weekly Review, 24 April 1987. 40. Kenya, Laws of Kenya. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1982, Cap 56, part III, para. 5(10)(d). 41. US Congress, Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, Public Law No. 101-513, at 593, 1991. 42. Ibid, pp. 159. 160. 43. See National Council of Churches of Kenya, CPK/ARCH. Synod Committee Report, April 1992 and Abuom, A., The Role of Kenyan Churches in Democratization. Paper Presented at a Conference on the Christian Churches and Africa's Democratization, Leeds, 1993. 44. See Kenya Episcopal Conference, "An Open Letter to His Excellency the President Daniel Arap Moi and the People of Goodwill in Kenya". Standard(Nairobi), 30 October 1993. 45. Sicherman Carol. "Kenya" in Race & Class. (April-June 1998, Vol. 57 (no. 4): p 63. 46. Amnesty International, Kenya Annual Report for 1997, (Amnesty International, 1998). 47. Ibid. 48. Article 19, Kenya post-Election Political Violence, Article 19, London 1998: pp 5-6.49. Kenya Human Rights Commission, Quarterly Repression Report, October- December 1995. Nairobi: Kenya Human Rights Commission and Kenya Human Rights Commission, Quarterly Repression Report, July-September 1996. Nairobi: Kenya Human Rights Commission, 1996. 50. See generally, United Nations, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations on Kenya, UN Doc. E/C. 12/1993/6, 1993. 51. See, United States, Kenya: Human Rights Report, 1995. Nairobi: Embassy of the United States of America, 1995. 52. Article 19, Kenya: Post-Election Political Violence. London: Article 19, p. 1, December 1998 and generally, Article 19, Deadly Marionettes: State Sponsored Violence in Africa. London: Article 19, October 1997. 53. Kenya Human Rights Report, Kayas Re-Visited, A Post-Election Balance Sheet, Kenya Human Rights Commission, Nairobi, 1998: pp 40. 54. Amnesty International Kenya Annual Report for 1997, (Amnesty International, 1998). 55. Amnesty International Report, Violation of Kenya Human Rights, (Amnesty International, September 1997). 56. Ibid. 57. "IPPG Recommendations and the Aftermath" Daily Nation, Nairobi, (16 January 1998). See also note 62. 58. Ibid. See also Amnesty International Report, Violation of Kenya Human Rights, Amnesty International, September 1997). 59. Amnesty International, Kenya: Political Violence Spirals, (Amnesty international, 10 June 1998). 60. US State Department. Report on KENYA Human Rights for 1999, (Washington D.C, State Department, February 2000). 61. Ibid. 62. Amnesty International Report, Violation of Kenya Human Rights, (Amnesty International, September 1997). 63. Ibid. 64. Ibid. 65. Amnesty International Report, Violation of Kenya Human Rights, (Amnesty International, September 1997). 66. Amnesty International, Kenya, Political Violence Spirals, (Amnesty International, 10 June 1998). 67. Ibid. 68. Ibid. 69. US State Department Kenya Report for Human Rights for 1999, Washington D.C, US State Department, February 2000). 70. US Department of State, Kenya Report on Human Rights for 1999, (Washington D.C, State Department, February 2000). 71. US State Department Kenya Report for Human Rights for 1999, (Washington D.C, US State Department February 2000). See also Kenya Human Rights Report, Kayas of Deprivation, Kayas of Blood, Kenya Human Rights Commission, Nairobi 1998 Korwa G. Adar is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations, International Studies Unit, Political Studies Department, Rhodes University. Isaac M Munyae recently completed his MA in International Studies, International Studies Unit, Political Studies Department, Rhodes University. The authors are indebted to the African Studies Quarterly review committee for their helpful comments Reference Style: The following is the suggested format for referencing this article:Korwa G. Adar and Isaac M. Munyae 2001. "Human Rights Abuse in Kenya under Daniel Arap Moi 1978-2001. African Studies Quarterly 5(1): 1. [online] URL: http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v5/v5i1a1.htm

KNOW YOU HISTORY FROM THE BEST RESEARCHERS

BY: Mohammed Bakari*

On the 27th of December, 2002, Kenyans went to the polls to elect a 210 member National Assembly.This was Kenya's 8th election in the last 40 years as an independent state.For all these years , the government was dominated by the ruling party, Kenya African National Union (KANU). Infact through a series of strategies, KANU had managed to perpetuate itself in power as a de facto, and later, a de jure , one party state.With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1990, politics and states in much of the world was transformed in many ways.In Kenya, the early nineties ushered in a serious opposition movement , the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy, which was an alliance of disgruntled politicians, young political idealists and other groups that were yearning for change from the autocratic politics of Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi and the power elite.The most prominent among these was the veteran politician and one time Kenyan Vice President and with populist tendencies, Jaramogi Ajuma Oginga Odinga.The mass movement, which by and large played by the rules, wanted to dismantle the notorious Section 2 (A) of the Constitution of Kenya which barred the formation of other political parties.But the winds of change in the early nineties were so violent and irreversable that the incumbent government had to bow down to increasing internal pressure from its opponents, and external pressure from international donar agencies , powerful foreign governments and human rights organizations like the Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. All these pressures did finally pay off when KANU revoked the relevant clause in the constitution to pave the way for the politics of multipartism.If it were not for the constant wranggling within the opposition ranks, KANU could easily have been dislodged from its dominant position in 1992.But it was not to be.The opposition parties were fragmented, largely thanks to the strategy of KANU throwing spanners in the opposition works and the buying off of potential politicians who posed a threat to KANU stranglehold on power.As it turned out, KANU won the 1992 election through fair and foul means and the opposition lost the chance of writing a new chapter in Kenyan politics.Because KANU had the resources and the infrastructure to organize themselves, they were able to repeat their success in the sunsequent election in 1997, though with a considerably reduced majority in Parliament. From 1992 Kenyans, like the Americans, go to the polls on a predetermined date of 27th of December of the election year.This has very little to do with the emulation of American democratic culture.It had everything to do with the decidedly Machiavellian nature of Kenyan politics , where situations were manipulated to derive the maximum advantage to those in power.By the early 1990s KANU was seen more as a tool of self- enrichment and self-aggrandizement by both the party politicians and the general public at large.It had icreasingly lost its credibility as development oriented and it had degenerated into the classic Fanonist conception of post - independence African political parties, which start off well as nationalistic, anti-colonial and well- intentioned, until the national bourgeoisie discover the usefulness of the party as a conduit to personal wealth , self-preservation and absolute power.KANU, in its forty years in power vindicated Fanon by living up to all the fears that he had for the future of political parties in Africa. A number of well connected politicians and party functionaries made a fortune for themselves , some losing it out of their own recklessness, like the Kamba politician, Paul Ngei, who had the dubious distinction of being the only former political detainee who served time in detention with the founding father of the Kenyan nation, Jomo Kenyatta , after the infamous Kapenguria trials, to be declared bankrupt and thus ineligible to contest any public office.He had increasingly been alienated by those who jossled for power and who saw in him as a likely rival, and thus driven out of KANU, to form an unsuccessful ethnically based party.Other more astute politicians played the game as they were expected to and became immensely rich. In the first 15 years a number of charismatic politicians lost their lives through political assassinations or perceived assassination.The most prominent among these were Pio Gama Pinto, Thomas Joseph Mboya(1) and Josiah Mwangi Kariuki(2) , Ronald Ngala, and Dr.Robert Ouko(3) and later, Bishop Muge. Mboya, the most charismatic politician that Kenya has ever had, was assassinated in July, 1969 , in a busy Nairobi street in broad day light; Kariuki, affectionately known as "J M," was brutally murdered and abondoned a few kilometers outside Nairobi, in the Ngong forest.His body was found on 5th March, 1975.Ronald Ngala died in a mysterious accident on a Christmas day. Robert Ouko was burned beyond recognition at Got Alila, virtually his own backyard, in 1990.These three politicians commanded country wide popularity and were national figures who transcended the narrow and parochial confines of their ethnic constituencies.From early on, Kenyan politics, or to be more precise, KANU politics , had all the characteristics of that brand of politics that is described by the epithet of Machiavellian: politicians who came in the way of particular interests were forced into line through pursuasion, bribing, intimidation and harassment, and if all those did not work, then resort to physical elimination was not ruled out. Kenyan politics was for a long time all about money. He who had the money controlled the politics, and Moi used money , or access to money in the form of fat government contracts, high governmental positions that were virtually sinecures, and in the last decade, access to land.The months leading to the first multiparty elections in 1992 was the high point in the abuse of public land. Government land became KANU's new cash cow.It was a short-cut to instant wealth and a source of campaign cash. The Last of the Autocrats : Moi and the Politics of Conformism When President Moi succeeded Jomo Kenyatta as the next President of Kenya in 1978, Kenyatta had already ensured that the Kikuyu, and in particular the Kiambu Kikuyu, dominated the governmental bureaucracy in the Civil Service, the banking system, the parastatals and other corporations that the government had a stake in , and also key jobs at the University of Nairobi. Also, a number of settlements were set up to resettle the landless Kikuyu from their densely populated ares in the Central Province to the Coast and the Rift Valley Provinces.In short, the Kikuyu dominated the national economy.The underestimated Arap Moi, on accession, made the dismantling of the Kikuyu power base the main plank of his domestic policy.The Kikuyu were until then, statistically the most numerous tribe in the country, followed by the Luo.The Luo tended to be mostly professionals but did not have a grip on the economy.He had less to fear from them than he did from the Kikuyu.In his relentless pursuit of the Kikuyu Moi enlisted the support of the minority tribes to virtually gang up against the Kikuyu.By using the time honored technique of divide and rule he was able to perpetuate himself in power for the next twenty four years. Moi had a big axe to grind with the Kikuyu, at least the Kikuyu elite.When Kenyatta suffered an initial heart attack and recovered, those Kikuyu politicians close to Kenyatta got a wake up call to find one of their own to take over the Presidency after Kenyatta was gone, and who was then already in his eighties,.The main stumbling block was the constitution which stipulated that on the death of a President, the Vice President automatically assumed power for ninety days until the elections are called.And the Kiambu politicians headed by Mbiyu Koinange could not countenance this situation of a non-Kikuyu assuming the presidency.An anti-Moi campaign was orchestrated to deny him his constitutional right and a 'Change the Constitution' movement was set in full gear.But other self-interested Kikuyus like the former Attorney-General and an incurable anglophile Charles Njonjo had an agenda different from their other clansmen.He joined forces with the non-Kiambu faction of the Kikuyu and other Kenyan minorities who saw a window of opportunity in supporting a minority leader and challenging Kikuyu dominance.Moi won the day, appointed Mwai Kibaki the Vice President, presumably on Njonjo's advice.It was expected that he would not last for very long.As it turned out, he was the most underestimated politician in the short Kenyan political history.The 1982 attempted Coup d'etat was to have far reaching repercussions on Moi's presidency. President Moi underwent a metamorphosis from a timid politician who lacked confidence to a skillful welder of autocratic power.It was this 1982 abortive attempted coup led by John Ochuka, a low ranking airforce officer, that spurred Moi to reinvent himself as a confident politician who was his own man.The fateful coup was quickly put down by a loyal Somali Muslim soldier, General Mahmoud Mohammed .The suppression of the coup restored a measure of confidence in Moi and he gradually consolidated his power and became a fully-fledged autocrat who totally dominated the political scene, by the use of public office to reward loyal party members or their supporters, who would indirectly support Moi. Merit had no place in this new cronyism and client politics.Putative loyalty was the sole criterion for selection and appointment to often lucrative public office.The result was the paradoxical situation where some barely literate cronies were appointed to ministrial positions to the exclusion of the more competent, better educated and qualified individuals who did not meet his own criteria.He was able to hide behind the alabi of ethnic and regional representation and balance.In reality he was comfortable with and constantly in search of yes-men, the type that Lenin described as "useful idiots". He also created a covey of bell-wethers like Shariff Nassir Taib, Kariuki Chotara and Mulu Mutisya.Through constant reshuffles, in the cabinet, the civil service, the diplomatic service, and government corporations he could appoint at will whom he chose and fired whoever failed to toe the line or fell out of favor. And in the bargain kept everyone guessing who would be next.The promotion and demotion announcements were made over the radio, and often at the lunch hour news bulletins from the State controlled Kenya Bradcasting Corporation. Most appointees or the demotees were notified by their friends or relatives.But the jewel in the crown was the Priventive Detention Act, which empowered him to detain anyone arbitrarily for long periods of time, and only release them at his own pleasure.This particular law was a remnant of the colonial legacy which in Britain was only resorted to in times of war.In Kenya it was an instrument to be welded against political dissents.Among those who became victims of this arbitrariness were politicians , intellectuals, rare bureucrats and academics.These included Oginga Odinga, a former Vice President, and his son, Raila Odinga, the famous Kenyan novelist and academic Ngugi Wa Thiong'o(4), Dr. Willy Mutunga, Gibson Kurian Kamau, Dr. George Katama Mkangi, Koigi Wa Wamwere, Dr.Alamin M.Mazrui and Kenneth Matiba. These excessive powers, which were aminable to abuse , were enshrined in the constitution, and were a throwback to the constitutional arrangements that were put in place when Kenyatta came to power in the wake of nationalist euphoria.The main architect of this constitution was none other than the distinguished African-American jurist and Supreme Court judge, Thurgood Marshall.The constitution, like Swiss cheese, had enough loopholes to enable the incumbent to exhibit what Ali Mazrui famously described as the " monarchical tendencies in African political culture." Important executive orders were made in an impromtu manner in political rallies or at the roadside.A swahili slogan, "fuata nyayo"- follow in the footsteps- became the rallying cry of the sychophant politicians to force everybody to sing the tune of conformism. Nyayoism was elevated to a "philosophy", only that there was no one to explain exactly what constituted this "philosophy", if it was a philosophy at all. It is interesting that the U.S. based Kenyan political scientist Ali Mazrui had earlier anticipated, in his book The Political Sociology of the English Language in Africa that in Africa, slogans are too readily elevated to "philosophies." When the government was confronted by new demands for new standards of human rights observance , harassment degenerated to naked and unbriddled thuggery where targeted politicians' property was vandalized , just to send home the message that the more things changed the more they remained the same. It was this context that gave birth to the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy ( FORD ), a loose coalition of all aggrieved and disgruntled individuals who felt that change was needed.Young, better educated and articulate politicians who saw no rooms for themselves in the political space in the context of African veneration for age before education and competence started to pose considerable challenge to the old order personified by Moi.This period of active oppositional politics gave rise to new political faces like those of Paul Muite, Professor Anyang' Nyon'go, Richard Leakey, Raila Odinga, Khalid Balala, among many others, who refused to play by Moi's rules;they had their own game plan.These were all members of a different generation from that of Moi and his cronies.The average age of the younger generation was forty.This batch of politicians was christened by the local press as " the Young Turks."Among this new breed of politicians Raila Odinga emerged the most astute and capable and with a clear and formidable ethic following. The Rise and Rise of Raila Odinga and the Fall of Daniel Arap Moi Raila Odinga, a relatively young mechanical engineer trained in what was then East Germany came into politics more in default than by design.A scion of a distinguished political family, the son of one of the most famous Kenyan politicians with international reputation as a socialist of some sort, Raila got involved in politics more out of spite than a real love of politics.For one thing , he was living under the charismatic shadow of his towering father who was still active in politics until he died , in 1995, in his eighties.Despite his age, he was seen by many as an embodiment of all that was moral in Kenyan politics.In a word he was an idealist of the first rank. He was above all considered the most persecuted politician in post-independence Kenya having been detained for long periods by both Kenyatta and Moi.Over the years he had assembled young Luo intellectual admirers whom he engaged and sought advice from .Among these were Dr. Elisha Stephen Atieno-Odhiambo, then a professor of History at the University of Nairobi, and Dr. Anyang' Nyong'o, University of Chicago trained political scientist teaching at Nairobi also.It was these contemporaries of his that had worked with his father that Raila Odinga relied upon in working a strategy to capture power.Odinga was the Chairman of the original FORD party, until new alliances were formed and the party broke into two wings, FORD - KENYA and FORD- ASILI.The party fragmanted further into FORD-PEOPLE, led by Mr. Kenneth Matiba, who had fallen out with Moi, and became the focus of Kikuyu support and mobilization.On the death of his father in 1994 Raila Odinga was nominated to lead the party.Dr. Atieno-Odhiambo became a close confidante of Raila , just as he had earlier been to his father.Soon after the abortive coup of 1982 Atieno-Odhiambo was briefly detained for interrogation.When he was released he found his way to the United States, via Oxford, where he still teaches at Rice University in Texas.He is one of Raila's chief political strategists.Early on the strategy was to capture power in the long - run, and in the short-term to forge alliances with other ethnic groups and to cultivate an image of a national rather than an ethnic politician(5). He was already on his way towards being a politician of national stature by virtue of the fact that he chose an urban constituency, Nairobi , to stand for parliamentary elections.His brother, an Oginga Odinga look-alike, stood in Bondo, their father's constituency when he was not in detention.Raila is the most popular Luo politician among his own ethnic group and among the Kenyan lumpen-prolitariat, as the new Mr. Clean of Kenyan politics and the champion of the dispossessed.He was the most feared by Moi among the Kenyan politicians because of his ability to stirr up his supporters to wreck havoc, when necessary.In his jossling for power he has practiced real politik , by forming alliances with non-Luos from all areas of the republic.For example he supported Prof. Rashid Mohamed Mzee, a Muslim politician from the Coast, as the deputy Chairman of his new party, Nationl Development Party of Kenya .When the turn came to select a Nominated member of parliament he shrewedly suggested a Muslim Digo woman whose father was a long time Odinga supporter from the Kenya People's Union days, formed after Odinga was provoked into leaving KANU after the infamous Limuru Conference of 1966, where Tom Mboya was especially instrumental in hounding him out of the party and out of the Vice - Presidency of Kenya.While all along Mboya was recognized as the leading Luo politician, he was suddenly now dubbed as an Abasuba, meaning a nilotized Bantu , ethnically closer to the other Bantu groups but culturally Luo. Infact the majority of the Suba had no knowledge of Kisuba but for all practical purposes spoke Dholuo, the language of the Luo people(6).During the Moi era the Suba identity was encouraged to alienate the larger Luo tribal group.Raila was cognizant of all these developments and seemed to learn from the mistakes of his father.This is where he probably differs from his father: Odinga senior was known for his impulsiveness, he was short temperd, whereas Raila is more circumspect.He realises the necessity of bidding one's time in politics, for, as the saying goes, one week is very long in politics.And this is precisely what happened with Odinga junior. Come the General Elections 2002, a series of unexpected events unfolded that precipitated in unprecedented alliances.Opposition alliance as a united front had been eluding the opposition parties since the early 1990s.The major political parties in the opposition such as Ford-Kenya, Ford- People, Democratic Party , Safina , Social Democratic Party and others could never agree to field one Presidential condidate to oppose Daniel Arap Moi, partly , as we noted, throuh the hiddden hand of KANU.Ironically it was Moi who sealed the fate of KANU when he chose a relative greenhorn , Uhuru Kenyatta as his annoited successor, an outsider within the KANU inner circle and the so called kitchen cabinet, composed of those closest to the president. Moi's choice, generally believed by many to have been determined more by personal rather than national interests infuriated and thus alienated a significant portion of ambitious KANU loyalists who felt snubbed by the choice of this virtually apolitical nominee from a now less regarded Kenyatta family.This trump card of Moi's did not work and had the unexpected effect of haemorrahging memebership of KANU into the lap of the opposition parties.The opposition was already trying to get its act together, as they always tried to around the election times, by forming the National Allaince of Kenya, as an ambrella party to take into its fold all the dissenting voices.There was little in the form of an agenda that was common to these opposition parties; they were only united in their determination to see Moi removed from power.They sensed that once Moi was out of the way, he was going to create a domino effect internally and KANU was going to fall like a house of cards.During the fateful party convention at the Kasarani Centre, Moi played Machiavelli and through duplicity ensured that George Saitoti, the incumbent Vice-President, was removed out of the way and all the other ambitious potential contenders were properly reduced to size. But this was a new KANU which had come into being through the dissolution of Raila Odinga's party, NDP, which months before had merged with KANU and had been sufficiently assimilated to give cabinet positions to Raila and a few of his former party colleagues.Moi thought he could outflank Raila and get his wish carried through to nominate Mr. Kenyatta, with little or no opposition.Raila, as a shrewed politician challenged Moi by questioning the criterion on which this selection was made.Raila had an agenda of his own, to insinaute himself into a sufficiently critical position and to eventually grab as much power as possible and get himself nominated as the KANU presidential candidate.. Both Moi and Raila had hidden agendas of their own and each tried to use the other to advance their barely concealed interests.Moi used the bugbear of kikuyu-phobia to intimidate Raila into his alliance against the Kikuyus.Raila knew that in the new KANU he was the only charismatic leader who could carry the day for the party and who could shrug off any Moi orders.On his part Moi assumed that he could use Raila to get for his party the block Luo vote and thus completely trounce the fargmanted Kikuyu.The choice of the Amherst educated Uhuru was doomed from the start: he was a Kikuyu insider outsider.He had already been disowned by his people by being rejected in the last parliamentary election from his own Gatundu home constituency.He had been perceived as a Moi lackey who had been planted to sow mischief among his tribesmen.By astute maneuvring Moi was able to gradually bring into the KANU fold some of his bitterest Kikuyu critcs who saw him as an undisguised anti-Kikuyu.These politicians sure were stuck in the tribal politics of the late 1960s and 1970s and who saw Kenyan politics in Manichean terms of 'us Kikuyus' and 'them non-Kikuyus.'They saw this as an opportunity to return to the old days of Kikuyu glory.Among these politicians included Njenga Karume, the linchpin of GEMA politics and Kihika Kimani, the Nakuru demagogue who had personally benefitted from playing the tribal card.What escaped the notice of these politicians of bygone days was that the younger Kikuyus, by virtue of their education, cosmopolitanism and the bitter experience of the anti-kikuyu mood of the country after the the death of Kenyatta and the ascension of Moi fanned by the old KADU elements in KANU, had left behind ethnic politics in favor of forging alliances with other groups in the country.Besides, Kenyan society had become better educated, more integrated and more sophisticated than it was when Moi took over power and recogized the importance of the new politics of consensus and coalition building. It was this climate that paved the way for the possibility of realignment of opposition forces , facilitated by the mass exodus of disgruntled elements that, now that Moi's exit was irrevocably inscribed in stone by the constitution, they could afford to stage mass rebellion and lose nothing for it.Only the deferential and the obsequious like Katana Ngala, and the indicisive and irresolute Mudavadi stayed put in the party.They had miscalculated and misread the public mood for a new start and a clamor for a more democratic and open society that was free of corruption , coercion and the violation of human rights.Moi, at 78 , was already losing the will to fight and his characteristic instinctual politics had for once failed him.He was booed in virtually every political rally that he addressed.The massive crowds that he was used to when he came to power had degenerated to rallies with only forced school children in attendance, or positioned opposition supporters only there to hackle him and his entourage of civil servants and the few loyalist politicians.The writing was already on the wall.Among the first to jump ship after the formalization of the charade that was the KANU nomination of Uhuru Kenyatta to contest the presidential elections on its ticket, was Raila Odinga.Because it was too late in the day to form a new political party he revived the little known and and almost moribund Liberal Democratic Party as a staging post into the new opposition secret weapon of National Rainbow Coalition or NARC, as it came to be widely known.All the astute politicians who read the national mood for change properly jumped into the Narc bandwagon. For the first time the already ambitious opposition politicians saw this as the last chance to garb power.The main players were Raila Odinga , Mwai Kibaki and Anyang' Nyong'o.Those who could not see themselves taking orders from Raila Odinga, like James Orengo or Anyang' Nyong'o, went on their own; but the electorate was no longer sympathetic for loners.James Orengo, one of the most iconoclastic politicians who could insult Moi at the height of his authoritarianism put his name as a presidential candidate.He lost both the presidency and his parliamantary seat that he had held for almost two decades.He lost his parliammentary seat to Archbishop Ondiek, an almost forgotten ex-parliamentarian whose only thing going for him was that he was Raila's choice and had his blessing.Like his father before him, Raila just has to show up his face and point to a certain candidate for that candidate to win an election.And like his father again, he is the uncrowned king among the Luo. Luoland is marked as Raila's political fiefdom.In his last political gasps and in moments of despair, just to spite Raila, Moi described the former as a 'tribal chief ' rather than a leader with a national outlook. Anyang' Nyongo is the most idealistic among the relatively younger generation of Kenyan politicians. Intelligent, urbane and not much given to hero-worshiping, he could not see himself beholden to the kind of politics that Raila practiced:accomodation tempered by a little threat of force.On defecting to the opposition, and confident of certain victory , Raila made it clear in public that if the opposition wins the forthcoming elections and Moi refuses to relinquish power , he promised that his gangs were going to storm the State House, the official residence of the Kenyan President.He was not to be taken lightly.As it turned out the opposition alliance won the majority of the seats and Raila did not have to live up to his threat.Anyang' as noted ealier , was very close to Raila's father, but he is too decent to contemplate the use of any kind of force.He is the most democratically minded Kenyan politician who is completely devoid of ethnocentricism of any kind.His vision, surmised from his writings and public statements is of a democratic, multicultural and progressive Kenya.Foremost among his ideals is a desire to see Kenya, and by extension the African continent, governed by the principles of rule of law and primacy of national institutions, rather than the current practice of government by charisma, where charismatic figures subordinate national institutions to their own personal whims.As one of the main architects of the alliance of opposition parties he felt confident to work with all those progressive forces that wanted to see the dawn of a new era in Kenyan politics and subordinated their own personal ambitions for the common good.In this regard he was pragmatic enough to accept that he might have to work with Raila who is perceived as someone who encourages hero-worshipping among his Luo ethnic group, who sees himself as the man who should call the shots in his tribal homeland of Nyanza, where Anyang' Nyong himself hails from.It is also quite obvious that Raila had a hand in the defeat of Nyong'o in the last general election after refusing to play the ethnic card and wanting to be judged on his own merit.He had played an important role as a voice of reason in the previous parliament as one of the parliamentarians who contributed significantly to the debates in the House on national and international affairs. It was therefore not surprising that although his defeat was more out of design than default, he was sent back to parliament as a nominated member for the Social Democratic Party.Previously a very conscientious scholar and now a hardworking politician, he is likely to make significant contribution to the revitalization of the nation.With Kibaki at the helm, Nyong'o has found a kindred spirit in their desire to move Kenya forward. Winner Takes all Politics The National Rainbow Coalition in the apt phraseology of Andrew Harding, the BBC correspondent who was covering the Kenyan elections, was "a coalition of genuine reformers and opportunists."(7) The coalition was hastilly put together and expanded literally by the minute as former KANU supporters defected from the party they saw was doomed to certain defeat.Many of these defectors were hardcore KANU supporters who were alienated for one reason or another, but mainly because they failed to gain their former party nomination to stand for election.The logical thing to do was to go to the party that was winning more supporters from the electorate.Opinion polls conducted by a number of organizations, including that of the country's leading mass daily, Daily Nation, had predicted that the opposition alliance was poised to win a landslide.And they did.NARC swept the results with 125 out of the possible 210 parliamentary seats.KANU was second with 64 seats, FORD-People 14 , SAFINA 2, SISI KWA SISI 2, FORD-Asili 2, and SHIRIKISHO 1.According to the constitution NARC was strengthened to 132 after nominating 7 of the 12 nominated members.This gave NARC a clear majority that entitled it to form the next government.The nature of KANU politics was such that the laws were constantly changed to suit particular situations, which they never anticipated might work in favor of their opponents.A law was passed to completely rule out any possibility of a coalition government, which seems now to be almost the norm in the contemporary world of politics world-wide.Given KANU's party infrastructure and access to all the resources essential to win an election, like the control of public media, funds and the administrative and bureaucratic structure, there was no dobt in the minds of the KANU leadership that they were there for the long haul.One thing that they did not factor in in their calculations was the changed public mood.They should have read the signs when the opposition political rallies were increasingly drawing larger and larger crowds.The electorate was also predominantly young; KANU had by now alienated all the significant sections of the Kenyan electrorate including Muslims, women and minority ethnic groups.The only KANU stronghold left was the North Eastern Province, inhabited by pastoralist groups like the Somali and Boran, and the Rift Valley Province, Moi's stronghold.The opposition had over the years managed to make inroads into this KANU stronghold especially among the Marakwet and the Nandi, led by such fearless politicians as Kipruto Arap Kirwa who easily sailed through in his Cherengany constituency where he polled 16,878 votes, way ahead of his nearest contender by 10,000 votes.(8) Kirwa dared call Moi a dictator when he was still in KANU. The entire election was given a clean bill of health by international observers and the Electoral Commission of Kenya.While early on there were attempts at vote-buying , these were nipped in the bud by the Anti-corruption squad and the initiative of local whistle-blowers and watchdogs who were determined to check election rigging and election malpractices which had been the stock-in-trade of the previous government.But the real credit must go to the ordinary voters who not only refused to be cowed but also refused to be corrupted by any means.This was a real boon to the opposition who did not have any resources to speak of.They depended entirely on the goodwill and the desire for change of the electorate.The real shocker was the elimination of KANU die-hard Shariff Nassir Taib in the Mvita constituency in Mombasa by the young and untried Najib Balala, the defeat of the then just appointed Vice President Musalia Mudavadi.Other casualties included the lacklustre Cabinet Ministers Katan Ngala, Cyrus Jirongo, Chris Obure, Francis Nyenze and Haroun Mwau.A number of Assistant Ministers were also swept off by the new euphoria. NARC was now set to form a government of their own choice without needing support from either other opposition parties or KANU.The law that was rushed in parliament to give a one-party government to the party with the majority number of parliamentarians now came to suit the needs of the opposition for whom the law was intended in the first place to shut out the opposition from participating in government. The Revival of Mwai Kibaki and the End of Ethnic Politics Mwi Kibaki won a comfortable 62.2 per cent of the vote ( 3,646,713) to Uhuru Kenyatta's 31.3 per cent ( 1,834,468).He had a clear mandate to lead the Kenyan nation as the third post-independence President.This was beyond Kibaki's wildest dreams.He had unsuccessfully contested all the previous two elections on his own party's platform, the Democratic Party of Kenya.He was then perceived as a Kikuyu choice, or at least that is what KANU hammered on. He was also written off as a spent-force and talk was then of a younger future leader, just as had happened in Western Europe and the United States of America. Infact Moi used the age-factor as a viable stick to beat all the aging opposition contenders for the presidency. Only that the gambit did not work.The new review constitution had already taken care of that:the future president was have his powers whittled down to a bare minimum so that he will end up more as a ceremonial figure- head than an all powerful autocrat of the Moi mould.The opposition parties had negotiated the alliance with the spirit of the impending constitution in mind.The new innovation in the new constitution is the creation of the post of Prime Minister a la United Kingdom or Germany with the Bundes kanzler welding real political power and overseen by parliament.There is also the creation of two positions of Deputy Prime Ministers.The likelihood is that Raila Odinga will emerge as the future Prime Minister if the alignments stand as they are to date, once the constitution is ratified and voted on by the new chamber.At 71 Kibaki is less energetic than he was in the prime of his life, when he served in the successive Kenya governments under Jomo Kenyatta, and then under Moi.Although universally respected as an able former Finance Minister at the time he held that portfolio, Kenyan economy at present is not what it was in the late sixties and the seventies.The economy is now battered through years of mismanagement and the plunder of the national treasury and the added burden of debt repayment to the international lending institutions have all but left the country with just its head above water. It is badly in need of fixing.The best person to do the job might not be Kibaki himself, but he has sufficient goodwill from the donar community and the Bretton Woods institutions to revitalize the economy. He at least has a pool of talented Kenyans both at home and abroad that he can mobilize to rethink the economy.The scale of the problem is such that he cannot wait to get the job started. Infact he already has set the wheels in motion by assembling a team with varied talents. Most notable about the team is its representativeness, their education, its youthfulness and its enthusiasm. The top priority job of National Planning has gone to Anyang' Nyong'o; that of Finance has gone to Mwiraria, a close political ally for a long time, but whether he is up to the job only time will tell.Kibaki has clearly reinvented himself as far as ethnic politics are concerned.The older generation of Kenyans still remember that when he was the Finance Minister he appointed his Kikuyu tribesmen to handle the key levers of the economy.All the major banks that were owned by the governement , Kenya Commercial Bank and the National Bank of Kenya and of course the Central Bank of Kenya he manned with Kikuyus. John Michuki headed KCB and Stanley Githunguri NBK , while Duncan Ndegwa was at the helm at CBK.It was obvious that Kenyatta and his cronies had something to do with that state of affairs.Only after Moi came did non-Kikuyu faces appear in those vital institutions that made sure that the politically correct people got access to credit.Moi on his part, as he cynically put it, was " following in the footsteps of the great Mzee" and stuffed those positions with his fellow Kalenjin technocrats, or at best , people who could be trusted to play to his tune.But the decade that Kibaki had been in the cold, and the period he served under both Mzee Jomo Kenyatta and Moi taught him the lesson of the banality of ethnic politics.Besides, the young idealists in the new cabinet should act as a counter-balance to the ambitious and opportunistic elements in NARC.It would be hard for the opportunists to play by the new set of rules after spending years in the midst of landgrabbers, sinecure holders and deal-makers whose sole purpose in politics was wheeling and dealing for themselves and their loved one.The countervailling aspect is the culture of debate that has developed in the former opposition , a long way from the days of fractious and sometimes violent politics in their ranks, occasioned often by frustration.In an optimistic address to the nation President Mwai Kibaki showed off his diverse and talented team and what their future mission is: "The National Rainbow Coalition represents the future of Kenyan politics.Narc is the hope of this country.Our phenomenal success in so short a time is proof that working together in unity, we can move Kenya forward.Look around you , see what a gorgeous constellation of stars we are, just look at this dazzling mosaic of people of various ethnic backgrounds, race, creed, sex, age, experience and social status.Never in the history of this country have its leaders come together as one indivisible entity with one vision.It is the love of Kenya that has brought us together.We chose to let go our individual differences and personal ambitions in order to to save this nation."(9) He went on to add : "We want to bring back the culture of due process, accountability and transparency in public office.The era of "anything goes" is gone forever.Government will no longer be run on the whims of individuals.The era of roadside policy declarations is gone.My government's decisions will be guided by teamwork and consultations.The authority of Parliament and the independence of the of the Judiciary will be restored and enhanced as part of the democratic process and culture taht we have undertaken to bring to foster.Fellow Kenyans, I am inheriting a country which has been badly ravaged by years of misrule and ineptitude.There has been a wise disconnect between the people's aspirations and the government's attitude toward them.I believe that government exists to serve the peopel and not the people to serve the government...Governrment is not supposed to be a burden on the people, it is not supposed to intrude on every aspect of life , and it is not supposed to mount roadblocks in every direction we turn in life.The true purpose of government is to make laws and policies for the general good of the people, maintain law and order , provide social services taht can enhance the quality of life, defend the country against internal and external aggression, and generally ensure that peace and stability prevails.Corruption will now cease to be a way of life in Kenya, and I will call upon all those memebers of my government and public officers accustomed to corrupt practices to know and clearly understand that there will be no sacred cows under my government..."(10) The transatlantic idiom of "disconnect" is clearly far from Mr. Kibaki's generation.It reflects the spell cast by the younger minds in his government and a new political mind-set.The will is there to change the nature of society as it is currently constituted since, except for the kleptocracy, the general mass of the people felt constrained by the non-performing national institutions which had been neglected in pursuit of the politics of divisiveness, greed and obsequiousness.Considered a decent and gentleman, the main saving grace is that there are no known people around him of the same putative reputation of either Mbiyu Koinange during the Kenyatta regime, or Kipyator Arap Biwott during the "Nyayo" era. It was widely believed these two politicians had an inordinate influence on the two presidents behind closed doors.They had emerged as powerful power brokers. Kibaki is a self-confident man fully conscious of his abilities.He is likely to have advisers in the Western liberal sense, rather than 'advisers' in the sense commensurate with established practice in African political culture where such figures are viewed with skepticism.The New York Times captured the nature of government during the Moi era when they editorialized that : "The departing Mr.Moi, 78, was from the old - school of African politicians that demand absolute loyalty from the populace.For much of his tenure it was against the law to speak ill of him."(11) The style of government is likely to change. Conclusion The dramatic change of government in Kenya is the culmination of a series of events that had precipitated over the last forty years of KANU. The party had evolved from a vibrant nationalist institution to a tool of the power-elite for self-preservation and aggrandizement. Cracks in its edifice began to show after the collapse of the Soviet Union when the West demanded more accountability before the landing institutions and donor countries could make aid available, from which most African governments sustained themselves. The emergence of a new generation of leaders with better education, sophistication, and idealism made it possible to not only challenge the old order, but also gradually undermine its claim to legitimacy. The fact that corruption, blatant abuse of human rights, divisive ethnic politics had been ingrained in the Kenyan body politic did not help matters for the ruling elite. They had almost completely lost credibility as a group, to turn things round. But ultimately, the decision on the part of the fragmented opposition to close ranks and work toward the defeat of KANU paid dividends in the end. The classic Machiavellian politics played by the previous regimes seem have no place in the new dispensation. The new constitutional arrangements are sure to stop potential autocrats in their tracks. * Prof. Mohamed Bakari is a faculty member at Fatih University NOTES 1) See Goldsworthy, David : Tom Mboya: The Man Kenya Wanted to Forget. Africana Publications. 1982.2) See, Kariuki, J.M. Mau Mau Detainee. Oxford University Press, Nairobi. 1964.3) See Anguka, Jonah: Absolute Power: The Ouko Murder Mystery. Pen Press Publishers. 2002.Also see E.S.Atieno-Odhiambo: The Murder of Robert John Ouko, Foreign Minister of Kenya, 12-16 February, 1990.In Exceptional Spaces, Dolla Pollick ( ed.) Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press (1998), Pg. 77-97.4) See Wa Thiong'o, Ngugi: Detained.Heinemann.London.1978.5) Dr. E.S. Atieno-Odhiambo, personal communication, African Studies Association Annual Coference, Seattle, Washington, 1992.He just returned from Kenya where he played a role the election strategy, and prior to that, in the negotiations leading to the formation of NARC, e-mail correspondence to the author dated 31/1/200.Also see E.S. Atieno-Odhiambo, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga. East African Educational Publishers.1998.6) For the history of the Kenyan Luo people see Ogot, B.A.: A History of the Southern Luo. East African Publishing House, Nairobi, Kenya, 1967.Also for Luo nationalist politics see the autobiography of Odinga, Oginga Odinga,: Not Yet Uhuru, Heinemann, London, 1968. 7) BBC-World news, 29th December, 2002.8) Electoral Commission of Kenya results.9) Inaugural address, New President Spells out his Vision:http://www.nationaudio.com/News/ DailyNation/Today/News/News3112200231.html10) ibid11) http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/31/international/africa/31KENY.html

THERE IS SKELETON IN THE CLOSET FOR KALONZO

Living in perpetual hunger Lack of irrigation facilities, a lackluster government policy and abject poverty has subjected residents of some areas to a complete dependency on relief food. However, the process of relief distribution is flawed, making a section of the population live in perpetual hunger. Zachary Ochieng The famine and its devastating effects has been associated with the agricultural marginal areas of North Eastern and Eastern provinces, especially Ukambani. This has culminated in a situation where those areas are virtually on permanent relief programmes. Sections of Nyanza, Western, Coast and the northern Rift Valley province, have been known to experience intermittent food shortfalls owing to drought or floods that have occasionally disrupted subsistence farming activities, leaving residents with no option but to appeal for famine relief. Last month, the government provided 2500 bags of maize and beans to famine stricken residents of the Coastal Kilifi District. Area District Commissioner Oku Kaunya observed: "The failure of rains in the last two seasons has led to shortages in Kaloleni, Bamba and Ganze divisions". But still, North Eastern and Ukambani remain the showcase of the history of famine in the country, not only due to harsh climate but also due to lack of mechanisms to ensure self reliance in food. Apart from the unavoidable drought phenomenon, residents of these areas have been yearning for long lasting solutions to no avail, prompting widespread claims that the government has not been keen in helping those areas for political reasons. Situated in the climatically volatile Eastern province that has seen non-kamba inhabited districts such as Moyale and Isiolo fall into the same administrative orbit, Ukambani - which comprises Machakos, Kitui, Makueni and Mwingi districts - is somewhat synonymous with famine, owing to recurrent crop failures, resulting into perpetual dependency on food handouts. The pathetic nature of perpetual hunger in the area was dramatically brought to the fore in 1997 when a boy was reported to have died after feeding on a dog's carcass in Kitui. Quite often, rains come late or in small amounts, resulting into all round crop failure. As a result, subsistence farming is almost grounding to a halt, since a number of area residents no longer bother to cultivate even if rains come, given the high probability of their efforts going to waste. Paradoxically, Ukambani is described as an agro-ecological area, meaning that the area can be utilized for agricultural use since it lies between two major perennial rivers - Tana and Athi. Besides persistent calls for the establishment of an irrigation network, other solutions that have been floated include the need for the government to provide subsidies in seed and farm inputs so as to increase production that can enable farmers in the area to maintain sufficient food reserves. But as numerous calls are made for the government to chip in and offer long- term solutions, other factors such as poverty and the inability to embrace crop diversification have played a significant part in the perennial famine in the area. Besides, it is not the question of ability to produce enough food to survive the next harvest since the area is hardly a food basket, but the lack of resources to afford a decent diet all year round. "In terms of the total supply of food, there is no problem. The problem is with the vulnerable groups whose purchasing power has declined over the past few years", avers Dr Mulinge Mukungu, an Agricultural Economist at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Mission in Nairobi. Prof Amartya Sen, an Economics Nobel laureate from India also concurs that famine is a result of poverty and not shortage of food. In his book "Poverty and Famines"(1981), Sen pointed out that it is not the availability of food but the absence of entitlement among the poor people that has been responsible for famines all over the world. He wrote: "If one person in eight starves regularly in the world, this is seen as the result of his inability to establish entitlement to enough food; the question of the physical availability of the food is not directly involved". Sen further points out that famines are almost always man-made and says political will is needed to dismantle this obstacle of vested interests. The two experts' views hold true for Ukambani, since when it registers a bumper harvest as it did after the 1998 El Nino rains, farmers sell their harvests to businessmen outside the area, sometimes at extremely low prices, thus reverting to the cycle of famine relief dependency. This is due to poverty and no other source of income for upkeep. Unlike Ukambani that presents some hope as far as self- reliance in food is concerned, the arid and predominantly pastoral North Eastern province - in addition to drought and insecurity due to cattle rustling and general banditry that have significantly affected the marginal farming activities in the area - suffers from a deplorable lack of infrastructure. Lack of sufficient water resources for both humans and animals is a major problem in the region as the few water wells dry up immediately drought sets in. This forces the government and other relief agencies to respond with mobile water bowers that are hardly adequate. Predominantly inhabited by the ethnic Somali, and whose residents cite lack of infrastructure as an example of deliberate neglect by the government, the region is still haunted by insecurity dating back to the early days of independence when a secessionist war raged, and more recently, spillover banditry from neighbouring Ethiopia and Somalia. Whereas it can be acknowledged that famine has been a real threat to the Kenyan nation, it is still difficult to determine the extent of the problem because local politicians either exaggerate the problem or devalue its extent, depending on which side of the political spectrum they fall, thus obscuring the real situation. Early 2000, several arid and semi-arid areas, notably Turkana and Wajir in the north and the eastern districts of Kitui and Mwingi faced food shortages following erratic rains in late 1999. While MPs Adan Keynan (Wajir West) and Bare Shill (Fafi) claimed that close to 100 people had died of starvation and more than 57000 needed relief assistance, Wajir District Commissioner Fred Musami insisted no one had died of hunger as did Sheriff Nassir, State Minister in charge of relief and rehabilitation. Ironically, agriculture is the mainstay of the Kenyan economy and maize is the single most important staple crop. The country produces 2.3 million tones of maize a year and has yet to attain self-sufficiency in maize production. Several constraints have been cited. Chief among these is the rapidly growing population and the unpredictable weather. Crop diseases and pests are also to blame. According to Dr Stephen Mugo, co-ordinator of the Insect Resistant Maize for Africa project at the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI), maize worth Sh 5.9 billion is lost every year to crop diseases and pests. "Whereas drought and low soil fertility sometimes cause losses of about 7 and 17 per cent of the total production, damage caused by diseases and pests ranges between 15 and 90 per cent", says Mugo. In a paper titled "Genetically Modified Food and Maize: Solution or problem", Mugo argues that Kenya must now embrace biotechnology to produce maize strains with high disease tolerance capacity as well as resistance to adverse weather. He says biotechnology is the only solution to the problem of food security. However, experts are almost unanimous that the main drawback in food security is unclear and misplaced government policy. In one of his papers published in the year 2000, Dr Hezron Nyangito of the Institute of Policy Analysis And Research (IPAR) wrote: "The food problem for marginal grain growing areas will not be resolved until marketing for alternatives, including cattle, is streamlined and policy formulated to boost income levels." If it were not for misplaced policies and lack of political commitment, Kenya could easily borrow a leaf from Israel, whose arid and semi arid land has been put to proper use. It began with the creation of the Israeli Agricultural Centre, an equivalent of KARI, which put a lot of effort into developing or co-opting a variety of technologies such as plant biotechnology, aquatic, pest control and seed technology. Then there was irrigation of extensive dry lands making up most of Israel. Scientific irrigation methods, including the super-efficient drip irrigation method were invented with remarkable results. In the face of persistent hunger, most residents are forced to rely on relief food. But just like the government's poor policies, the mechanisms of relief food distribution are equally flawed. The process of relief distribution has been riddled with controversies ranging from discrimination and favouritism on political grounds, commercialization and diversion of relief consignments to the contentious use of relief food to buy votes. On a positive note, however, the government is currently reviewing the country's national food policy to be in line with recent global developments, according to Agriculture Minister Bonaya Godana. "Some of the issues being looked at critically in the process of the review include increasing access to food, making food affordable to the people, disaster preparedness, maintenance of strategic food reserves and creation of income generation activities", said Godana at a workshop on food security in Africa held at the UNEP - Habitat, Nairobi in June, 2002. According to Godana, the nature of the problems and necessary strategies are well laid out in documents such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) 2001 - 2004, the current National Development Plan and the Poverty Eradication Plan, 2000 - 2015. But from past experience, these documents may just gather dust on the shelves as Kenyans continue starving.

TRICKS OF AMOLO ODINGA

It started with the son of the old, dead maestro Jomo, who was the son of Muigai. He knew this baby of Ngina had an ear with giraffeed professor of politics, and that he needed to be put out of the way like he did with professor Mbai; after he; Mbai had messed up with his Nyakisumu, Ada while he had been put into dentetion by the old professor of politics after August moja. The next one on the firing line was Brother in Christ and a protege of King of Ukambani late Mulu Mutisiya; Steve son of Musyoka, who had been pedestled by polls as the most popular presidential candidate in the battle fields of Kenya. The strategy worked well and it to be taken one more notch higher to contain the growing threat of this young Kalenjin worrior and another son of Mululu; who few years back had cowed from the same endevour after the old frofessor of politics had threatened to spill the beans of goldenburg but now had made a come back with a whole wagon of the sons of murembe and after realizing the old professor was nolonger a major threat to his neck. The two had forgotten the ol good days with Jirongo and Kamresh Patin will come to haunt them like a ghost. The Brits as with Murungaru, were to take care of that but in a very smart way. The game plan was to call for a meeting in London under the disguise of bonding together and on the process the whole world will be told that the son of Mululu and the heir of Koitalel were criminals, who were not supposed to get any travelling documents into the land of Queen Elizabeth, the moral barometer of the civilized world. It worked a miracle because Amolo son of Jaramong was in full attendance, whereby he was declared the only untainted ODMK candidate with blessings of baby breeder Arch Bishop Deya who also coupled as the financier of the whole meeting. WOOOOOh!!!!! He pulled one more coup as he is known as the Bob Denard (the french Mecenery and coup ploter) and an expert of jumping political party ships.

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TRICKS OF AMOLO ODINGA

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